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An important reason for the Internet’s remark-
able growth over the last quarter century is the
“end-to-end” principle that networks should con-
fine themselves to transmitting generic packets
without worrying about their contents. Not only
has this made deployment of Internet infrastruc-
ture cheap and efficient, but it has created fertile
ground for entrepreneurship. On a network that
respects the end-to-end principle, prior approval
fromnetwork owners is not needed to launchnew
applications, services, or content.
In recent years, self-styled “network neutrality”
activists have pushed for legislation to prevent
network owners from undermining the end-to-
end principle. Although the concern is under-
standable, such legislation would be premature.
Physical ownership of Internet infrastructure does
not translate into a practical ability to control its
use. Regulations are unnecessary because even in
the absence of robust broadband competition,
network owners are likely to find deviations from
the end-to-end principle unprofitable.
New regulations inevitably come with unin-
tended consequences. Indeed, today’s network
neutrality debate is strikingly similar to the debate
that produced the firstmodern regulatory agency,
the Interstate Commerce Commission. Unfortu-
nately, rather thanprotecting consumers fromthe
railroads, the ICC protected the railroads from
competition by erecting new barriers to entry in
the surface transportation marketplace. Other
20th-century regulatory agencies also limited
competition in the industries they regulated. Like
these older regulatory regimes, network neutrality
regulations are likely not to achieve their intended
aims. Given the need for more competition in the
broadband marketplace, policymakers should be
especially wary of enacting regulations that could
become a barrier to entry for new broadband
firms.
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Introduction
The 1970s saw two revolutions that would
transform the American economy for decades
to come.Onewas the early developmentof the
Internet. The other was awave of deregulation
that freed the nation’s transportation and
communications infrastructure from micro-
management by federal bureaucracies.
Each of those revolutions was tied to an
intellectual tradition that has profoundly
shaped the modern world. In the 1980s, the
Internet was one network among many, and
most of its competitors were built on propri-
etary standards. Partisans for the Internet
tended to be partisans for open technologies
more generally. As the Internet has emerged as
the undisputed winner of the networking
wars, it also became theposter child for “open-
ness,” the now-dominant ideology of Silicon
Valley.
Similarly, the deregulations of the 1970s
were brought about by a sea change in scholar-
ly attitudes toward government regulation.
Public policy scholars in the early 20th century
had imagined that neutral bureaucrats could
manage the economy and society. That naïve
optimism gave way to a more sophisticated
and skeptical view of the regulatory process in
the decades after World War II. Economists
begantosuggest that regulatoryprocesseswere
vulnerable to “government failures” akin to the
market failures often cited to justify govern-
ment regulations. Scholars articulated theories
of “regulatory capture” in which regulated
industries manipulated the regulatory process
for their own benefit. And they began to recog-
nize the frequency with which regulatory
schemes produce harmful, unintended conse-
quences.
In “The Broadband Debate: a User’s Guide,”
Columbia law professor TimWu dubbed these
two schools of thought the “openists” and the
“deregulationists,” respectively.1 The network
neutrality debatehasput theheirs of these tradi-
tions on a collision course. Each camp views the
other as a threat to the gains of the last quarter
century.Openistsworrythattheremnantsofthe
Bell system will regain control over the nation’s
communications infrastructure and transform
the Internet into a proprietary network. Dereg-
ulationists, on the other hand, worry that
Washington bureaucrats will gain control over
theInternet, returningthecountrytothebadold
days when government bureaucrats, notmarket
forces,determinedtheshapeofcommunications
markets.
These twomovements have come to regard
themselves as implacable foes, but they have
more in common than they like to admit: they
share the fundamental insight that too much
centralization and bureaucracy is detrimental
to innovation. But each is convinced that the
other’s agenda will bring about these unfortu-
nate circumstances. Eachcamphas sometimes
overstated its case and failed to take the other
side’s concerns seriously. And each camphas a
great deal to learn from the other.
The openist camp includes Internet pio-
neers like WorldWideWeb inventor Timothy
Berners-Lee,2 who is intimately familiar with
the prerequisites for online innovation. It
would be a mistake to dismiss too lightly this
camp’s concerns about the problems that
could be created by network discrimination.
The deregulationists include prominent
economists such asAlfredKahn,whooversaw
the deregulation of the airline industry under
President Jimmy Carter. Kahn possesses a
deep understanding of the unintended conse-
quences of government regulation. Ignoring
his concerns about the unintended conse-
quences of government regulation would be
equally misguided.3
“Network neutrality” has been given many
meanings, but the core dispute is overwhether
network owners will alter the Internet’s end-
to-end architecture. Openists fear this out-
come while some deregulationists welcome it.
Other deregulationists flatly deny that the
end-to-end principle has ever been the norm
on the Internet. But in fact, the end-to-end
principle has been the central organizing prin-
ciple of the Internet for a quarter century. And
both sides overestimate the power of the net-
work owners. The natural inertia of the
Internet’s architecture, together with the vigi-
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lance and technical skill of the online commu-
nity, is likely to provide an adequate counter-
weight to network owners’ efforts to trans-
form the Internet into a proprietary network,
regardless of the actions of government regu-
lators. Network owners who try to profit from
discriminatory practices will encounter stiff
resistance from an army of tech-savvy users
who rapidly develop and disseminate counter-
measures and workarounds. Network owners
will find that they lack the leverage to effec-
tively control the behavior of online firms and
users and that efforts to limit the activities of
their own customers are financial and public-
relations disasters.Network ownerswho try to
construct a “walled garden” of proprietary
applications and content are likely to be simi-
larly disappointed, as proprietary services fail
to keep pace with the open Internet. ISPs are
likely to respect network neutrality not
because they want to but because economic
and technological constraints leave them little
choice.
Concerns that network owners will under-
mine free speech online are particularly mis-
guided.Networkownershaveneither the tech-
nology nor the manpower to effectively filter
online content based on the viewpoints being
expressed, nor do profit-making businesses
have any real incentive to do so. Should a net-
work owner be foolish enough to attempt
large-scale censorship of its customers, it
would not only fail to suppress the disfavored
speech, but the network would actually in-
crease the visibility of the content as the effort
at censorship attracted additional coverage of
thematerial being censored.
The openists have a tendency to underesti-
mate the unintended consequences that can
occur when governments regulate. History
suggests that regulatory efforts to protect the
customers of major infrastructure owners
often end badly. The first such effort was the
creation of the InterstateCommerceCommis-
sion in 1887. The language of the Interstate
Commerce Act was strikingly similar to the
network neutrality language being considered
today. The ICC’s backers touted it as a way of
protecting the public from abuses by the rail-
roads, but in practice it reduced competition
in the railroad industry, effecting transfers of
wealth from the general public to the railroads
and other politically connected groups. Over
the course of the 20th century, the ICC trans-
formed virtually the entire surface transporta-
tion industry into a government-run cartel.
This and other examples suggest that policy-
makers should be extremely cautious about
enacting new regulationswhen nonregulatory
approaches might achieve the same goals.
If there’s one thing that almost all sides of
thenetworkneutralitydebate agreeon, it’s that
there is inadequate competition in the broad-
band marketplace. Given that consensus,
openists should think twice about demanding
new regulatory regimes that could create barri-
ers to entry for new market entrants. Comply-
ing with regulatory regimes requires the ser-
vices of lawyers, lobbyists, accountants, and
other highly paid professionals. Every dollar
spent on these activities is a dollar that cannot
be spent on R&D or new infrastructure.
Regulations designed with today’s technolo-
gies inmind could inpractice bar new entrants
with innovativebusinessmodels and technolo-
gies. Congress should therefore be reluctant to
impose regulations on a sector of the economy
thathas, until now, been largely free todobusi-
ness without government regulation.4
The existence of significant constraints on
the power of individual network owners and
the risks of unintended consequences sug-
gest that enacting prospective network neu-
trality regulation would be premature and
probably counterproductive. There is little
danger that network owners will fundamen-
tally transform the Internet’s architecture,
and so it would be unwise for policymakers
to enact new regulations to deal with vague
or speculative threats.
The Internet and
End-to-End
The Internet owes its extraordinary success
to a set of technical principles that have been
implicit in its design since it began life as an
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experimental network called the ARPANET in
1969. The most important of these principles
is the “end-to-end” principle, which holds that
computer networks should be decentralized,
withmost of the “intelligence” of the network
residing on computers at the network’s end-
points, rather than with routers at the core of
the network. The end-to-end principle gave
the Internet important technical and econom-
ic advantages that helped it to outpace its
rivals and become the world’s dominant com-
munications network.
The military’s Advanced Research Project
Agency (ARPA) was tasked with funding sci-
entific research thatmighthavemilitary appli-
cations. During the 1960s, it provided signifi-
cant funding to computer-science researchers.
One of the most important projects it funded
was an experimental packet-switched network
called the ARPANET. The networks already in
existence at the time of the ARPANET’s
founding were centrally managed, special-
purpose networks. The telephone system, for
example, was optimized for carrying phone
calls and little else. Indeed, AT&T strongly dis-
couraged users from using it for other pur-
poses. Adding a new capability (or “function-
ality”) to the phone network was a costly
proposition because it often required a com-
prehensive overhaul.
In contrast, ARPANET was designed to
accommodate a variety of different applica-
tions without modifications to the network.
By transmitting generic packets, rather than
phone calls or telegraph messages, it left the
sender and receiver free to decide for them-
selves what kind of information would be
transmitted and how that information would
be interpreted by the recipient. That gave the
system unprecedented flexibility. The net-
work’s designers initially envisioned the cre-
ationof file-transfer and remote-login applica-
tions (the predecessors of today’s FTP and
Telnet protocols5), but they wanted tomake it
easy for users to develop additional applica-
tions that were not envisioned by the net-
work’s creators.
That foresight paid off in 1972, when Ray
Tomlinson, an engineer at the firm that built
and managed the ARPANET, developed the
first e-mail program. E-mail rapidly became
the Internet’s “killer app.” Prior to the intro-
duction of e-mail, ARPANET was little more
than an interesting research project. But once
the head of ARPA, Stephen Lukasik, started
using e-mail to manage day-to-day ARPA
business, it became an indispensable com-
munications tool for military researchers.6
Indeed, a study commissioned just a year
after the debut of e-mail found that it already
accounted for three-quarters of all traffic on
the ARPANET.7
Crucially, Tomlinsondidn’t need to ask the
permission of the ARPANET’s operators to
develop his simple e-mail program, nor did
ARPANET users require anyone’s approval to
begin using it. All that was required to add e-
mail functionality to ARPANET was for the
sender and receiver to each have compatible
software installed on their computers.
ARPANET differed from the modern-day
Internet in at least one important respect: the
networkwas responsible for guaranteeing that
every packet made it from source to destina-
tion. In the event of congestion or other prob-
lems, the network would store the packet and
resend it at a later time, ensuring that it would
eventually be delivered. That design worked
well on a homogenous network with extreme-
ly limited computing power at the endpoints.
ARPANET’s reliability guarantees reduced the
burden on the programmers developing new
applications because they didn’t have toworry
about lost packets.
However, as packet-switched networks
becamemore popular, it became clear that the
ARPANET design had a serious weakness: the
ARPANET protocols were not well suited for
combining heterogeneous networks. Because
ARPANET applications depended on the net-
work’s reliability guarantees, all parts of the
network had to be designed to support them.
Researchers experimenting with new types of
networks (such as wireless) in which packet
loss was more common became convinced
that a new set of protocols was needed to join
together networks with diverse operating
characteristics.
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TCP/IP
The result, developed over the course of the
1970s, was the TCP/IP protocol suite (that is,
the collection of protocols) that forms the
foundation of today’s Internet.8 TCP/IP
achieved unprecedented flexibility by shifting
evenmore responsibility to the network’s end-
points. Unlike the ARPANET, TCP/IP-based
networks offer no guarantees about reliable
packet delivery. When an IP-based router
encounters congestion or other problems, it
simply drops any packets it can’t deliver in a
timely fashion, making it the responsibility of
the sender to notice that a packet hasn’t been
acknowledged and re-send it.9
A seminal 1984 paper by three MIT com-
puter scientists made explicit the end-to-end
design principles implicit in TCP/IP. In their
paper, “End-to-EndArguments in SystemDes-
ign,” J. H. Salzer, D. P. Reed, and D. D. Clark
pointed out that placing functionality at the
endpoints of a network, rather thanwithin the
network itself, could both lower costs and
increase the flexibility of the system.10 The
developer of any given application will have a
better idea of the appropriate level of function-
ality than will the designers of a network that
might be used by many different applications,
so the end-to-end approach avoids adding
unnecessary (and costly) functionality to a net-
work that won’t be used bymany applications.
Although the original end-to-end paper didn’t
focus on TCP/IP networks specifically, the
Internet has since become the paragon of the
principles described in the paper. On a TCP/IP
network, a router’s only responsibility is deliv-
ering individual packets to their destination.
Decisions aboutwhat to dowith those packets
are made by applications running at the net-
work’s endpoints.
The advantages of this decentralized
approach to network design is best illustrated
by the birth of the World Wide Web, an appli-
cation that many now regard as synonymous
with the Internet itself but which was not
inventeduntil 1990.TheWebwasdevelopedby
computer scientist Timothy Berners-Lee at the
European physics laboratory CERN. Berners-
Lee received limited support fromhis superiors,
and as a result the initial effort to develop the
World Wide Web was a shoestring affair with
only a handful of collaborators.11 Luckily, the
Internet’s decentralized design meant that no
special modifications to the Internet’s architec-
ture—or even permission from its operators—
were needed to deploy the Web around the
world. As soon as Berners-Lee completed work
on the first Web server, anyone who had an
Internet connection and a copy of his Web
browsing software could access it. Thanks to
the end-to-end principle, Berners-Lee and
dozens of others were able to launch new
Internet applications that could reach a world-
wide audience atminimal cost.
The Limits of Closed Networks
The current market for software onmobile
phones provides a stark contrast to this happy
state of affairs. In many cases, mobile applica-
tions can only be brought to market with the
explicit permission of the major wireless oper-
ators.TimWuhasargued thatdeveloping soft-
ware for mobile phones can be extremely frus-
trating, because on most mobile platforms,
developers have to spend asmuch timedealing
with the carriers’ bureaucratic approvalprocess
as they do actually developing their software.
Wireless carriers routinely impose elaborate
testing requirements, demand a cut of applica-
tion developers’ revenues, and even ban soft-
ware functionality that might conflict with
their existing businessmodels. The result is an
anemicmarket for phone-based software.12
Wu overstates his case in some respects. It is
possible to get smart phones that are relatively
free of carrier restrictions, although those
phones tend to be unsubsidized by the carriers
and therefore are significantly more expensive.
Phones based on Microsoft’s PocketPC plat-
form, for example, place relatively few restric-
tions on software development. And recent
developments includingthe introductionofthe
iPhone,13 the unveiling of Google’s Android
mobile operating system,14 and Verizon’s
announcement that it will make its network
moreopen,15 suggest thatcompetitivepressures
may continue to push wireless carriers toward
greater openness.AsWuhimself acknowledges,
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the predominance of closed cellular platforms
is not necessarily an argument for government
regulation.
But Wu’s paper powerfully illustrates the
downsides of closed networks. At present, it is
not as easy as it should be for a smart pro-
grammer to release innovative new mobile
software on a shoestring budget the way
Berners-Leedidwith theWeb twodecades ago.
Developers that wish to release software for
themostwidelydeployed cell phoneplatforms
must run the gauntlet of the major carriers’
approval processes. There are probably talent-
ed software developerswhoare being excluded
(and consumers being denied innovations)
becauseof thesebarriers.We should, therefore,
be concerned at the prospect of the Internet’s
becomingmore like a closed wireless network.
Recently, legal scholars have begun using
the term “network neutrality” to denote a
principle roughly equivalent to the end-to-end
principle. The concept of “network neutrality”
is rarely defined precisely, and network neu-
trality advocates sometimes disagree among
themselves about precisely which activities
violate it. For purposes of clarity, this paper
will mostly use the slightly narrower concept
of “end-to-end.” There are a few examples of
networkpolicies that arguably violate network
neutrality but not the end-to-end principle.
These are considered explicitly later in this
paper. But the end-to-end principle is a precise
technical concept that encompasses the great
majority of the behaviors that concern net-
work neutrality advocates.
The Internet succeeded because, thanks to
the end-to-endprinciple, it harnessed thepow-
er of decentralized innovation, allowing any-
one to add functionality to the network with-
out centralized decisionmaking. Today, the
importance of the end-to-end principle has
become the conventional wisdom, but there
are dissenters from this networking ortho-
doxy. In recent years, several important econo-
mists, legal scholars, and technologists have
argued that the emergenceofnewapplications
and growing Internet congestion have
strengthened the case for “smarter” networks
that give differential treatment to packets
based on their contents.
The Underwhelming Case
for Network Discrimination
A representative example of the argument
for network discrimination was put forward
by economists Robert Hahn and Scott
Wallsten of the (now-defunct) AEI-Brookings
Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.16 Hahn
and Wallsten view network neutrality regula-
tion as a kind of price regulation, requiring
that “last mile” broadband providers charge
content providers a price of zero for access to
their networks. They suggest that under a net-
workneutrality regime, applicationdevelopers
would have no incentive to “take into account
potential congestion costs of bandwidth-
intensive applications.”
This argument is based on a flawed under-
standing of the Internet’s basic structure. The
Internet is a collection of thousands of net-
works that agree to carry one another’s traffic.
Any pair of networks that wish to exchange
traffic negotiate an agreement specifying the
terms of interconnection. If one network is
significantly larger than the other, the smaller
network will typically pay the larger network
for connectivity, an arrangement known as
“transit.” If two networks are roughly equal,
they will typically carry each others’ traffic
without charge, an arrangement known as
“settlement-free peering.”17 Because these
agreements are negotiated in the context of a
competitive market, they tend to reflect the
full cost to each network of carrying the oth-
er’s traffic.
The price that an Internet firm like Google
pays for bandwidth includes the costs of secur-
ing “upstream”connectivity toothernetworks.
The costs of delivering traffic to a “last mile”
broadbandprovider likeComcast or Verizon is
implicitly included in the priceGoogle pays for
connectivity. Hence, Hahn andWallsten’s sug-
gestion that network neutrality allows Internet
companies to “use [network owners’] property
for free” is mistaken. Network owners do not
receive direct payments from all of the parties
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whose data they carry, but the network of con-
sensual interconnectionagreements thatbinds
the Internet together ensures that each Internet
user pays a fair share of the total costs of run-
ning the network.
With thousands of network owners and
hundreds ofmillions of users, it would be pro-
hibitively expensive for every network to
charge every user (or even every online busi-
ness) for the bandwidth it uses. Transaction
costs would absorb any efficiency gains from
such an arrangement. It wouldmake nomore
sense than an automobile manufacturer
requiring its customers to make separate pay-
ments to the manufacturers of every compo-
nent of a new automobile. One of the services
an ISP provides to its customers is “one stop
shopping” for Internet connectivity. This
arrangement has important economic advan-
tages and is unlikely to change in the foresee-
able future.
Application and Content Discrimination
Another prominent critic of network neu-
trality is Christopher Yoo, a law professor at
Vanderbilt University. Yoo correctly argues
thatwe shouldbe cautious about enacting leg-
islation that might foreclose beneficial evolu-
tion of networking technologies. But Yoo goes
beyond that general note of caution to offer
some specific arguments for abandoning the
end-to-end principle. Yoo’s arguments on this
score are unpersuasive.
Yoo contends that discriminating among
bandwidth-hogging applications could be an
effective way to minimize congestion.18 He
suggests that by charging users different
prices depending on the types of applications
theywish to use, or prohibiting the use of cer-
tain bandwidth-hogging applications alto-
gether, ISPs could avoid network gridlock
and improve the experience of ordinary users
who use standard Internet applications like
the Web and e-mail.
There are two major problems with this
approach tomanaging congestion.One is that
novice users are likely to find it confusing.
There are thousands of Internet applications,
includingonlinegames, business applications,
and social networking websites. The average
Internet user has no clear sense of the type or
amount of data any given application gener-
ates. Any pricing policy complex enough to
distinguish among the many categories of
Internet content is likely to be incomprehensi-
ble tomost customers.
Tech-savvy users would present an even
bigger headache for a network owner with a
discriminatory pricing strategy. If different
types of data were billed at different rates,
users would have a powerful financial incen-
tive to camouflage their high-priced bits to
look like lower-priced bits. That would spark
a technological arms race in which the ISP
developed more sophisticated filtering tech-
nology and users developed better evasion
techniques. Network owners would almost
certainly lose this arms race, but not before
spending millions of dollars on unnecessary
hardware and software.
If additional measures are needed to con-
trol congestion, it’s likely to be far more effec-
tive to instead impose content-neutral restric-
tions on bandwidth consumption. These
could take the formof bandwidth caps,meter-
ing, or limits on average throughput. Any of
these strategies could relieve congestion with-
out the problems of discriminatory traffic fil-
tering.19
Quality of Service
Some applications, such as Internet tele-
phony and online gaming, are extremely sensi-
tive to delays in packet delivery (known as
latency). Yoo suggests that it could be benefi-
cial for networks to give packets from these
applications higher priority than packets from
applications like the Web and e-mail that are
less sensitive to latency.20 Most Internet appli-
cations, including the Web and e-mail, are not
significantly disturbed by short delays in pack-
et delivery. However, some applications can be
significantly degraded by what network engi-
neers call “jitter,” or random delays in packet
delivery. Probably themost significant latency-
sensitive application is Internet telephony. An
occasional one-second delay in packet delivery
can dramatically degrade the quality of phone
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calls using a VoIP application (Voice over
Internet Protocol) such as Vonage or Skype.
“Quality of service” (QoS) technologies
attempt to guarantee a latency-sensitive appli-
cation such as Vonage a minimum amount of
bandwidth at all times. This obviously involves
routingpackets fromcertain (latency-sensitive)
applications in preference to packets fromoth-
er applications, and as such it would appear to
be a violation of the end-to-end principle.
Yoo contends that the need for QoS guar-
antees is a strong argument for relaxing the
end-to-end principle. But Ed Felten, a com-
puter scientist at PrincetonUniversity, offers a
couple of reasons why QoS guarantees may
not be as necessary as they seemat first glance.
A latency-sensitive application can sometimes
be converted into a non-latency-sensitive
application through clever engineering. For
example, streaming video is latency-sensitive,
but newer video applications such as YouTube
employ buffering, so that on a fast enough
network connection they almost always dis-
play the video smoothly. Second,QoS guaran-
tees are not needed on a network with a lot of
spare capacity. If an application’s bandwidth
needs are significantly less than the average
bandwidth available on the network, short-
term fluctuations in available bandwidthmay
not cause problems because the throughput
may never drop below the application’s mini-
mum rate. Felten suggests that some fast net-
works may have reached this point for voice
applications.21
Quality-of-service guaranties may prove
so expensive to implement that it would be
more cost-effective to focus on increasing
total capacity instead. QoS guarantees are
hard to implement on a heterogeneous net-
work like the Internet. From 1998 to 2001, a
group of researchers associated with the
Internet2 project conducted a series of exper-
iments with QBone, an experimental QoS
architecture. In 2002, they released a report
concluding that QBone suffered from “poor
incremental deployment properties, intimi-
dating new complexity for network opera-
tors, missing functionality on routers, and
serious economic challenges.” They argued
that the costs of QoS architectures are high-
er than the benefits and would “threaten the
scalability and flexibility of the Internet.”22
The fundamental problem is economic as
much as it is technical: introducing QoS fea-
tures makes network interconnection much
more complicated. It’s relatively easy to imple-
ment QoS guarantees on an integrated net-
work owned entirely by one network provider,
because the network can have centralized
management infrastructure that allocates the
necessary bandwidth to each application. But
Internet traffic almost always traverses more
than one network, and a QoS guarantee for
half of a network path isn’t worth much. The
Internet was deliberately designed without a
centralized authority that could allocate band-
width to favored applications. Nor is there
anything resembling a billing infrastructure
that would allow applications to purchase
guaranteed bandwidth on other networks.
If effective QoS technologies are developed,
they are likely to be implemented in a decen-
tralized manner that is consistent with the
spirit of the end-to-end principle. For example,
one of themost prominent schemes for packet
prioritization is DiffServ, developed in the late
1990s.23 Under this scheme, network end-
points mark each packet with one of a small
number of priority classes. When routers
encounter congestion, they drop lower-priority
packets before higher-priority ones. To prevent
cheating, routers at network boundaries limit
the number of high-priority packets the net-
workwill accept per user, reclassifying or drop-
ping packets to enforce pre-existing limits on
the number of high-priority packets the net-
work will accept.24
A more ambitious proposal was laid out
in a recent paper by Lawrence G. Roberts, the
man who led the original ARPANET project,
and two other researchers. It proposes a QoS
architecture for the Internet that would allow
any network endpoint to request bandwidth
guarantees using a standardized protocol,
with intermediate routers indicating whether
they have the spare capacity to guarantee the
requested bandwidth.25
These designsmay be inconsistentwith the
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end-to-end principle narrowly conceived, but
they are consistent with the end-to-end princi-
ple in the sense that they leave network end-
points with the ultimate authority to decide
which packets should get priority treatment.
Under these schemes, networksdonot attempt
to classify packets based on their contents or
prioritize based on the network owner’s judg-
ments about which applications or content
merit priority treatment. Rather they allow
users and application developers to decide
which applications are latency-sensitive.
There would be no real advantage, and
considerable disadvantages, to having net-
work owners try to recognize latency-sensi-
tive traffic based on packet contents. First,
such a scheme would undermine one of the
Internet’s core strengths: the ability of new
applications to be deployed without consult-
ing the hundreds of companies that manage
various parts of the Internet. If network own-
ers adopted lists of latency-sensitive applica-
tions that would receive higher priority, a
company launching a new, latency-sensitive
application would need to lobby dozens of
network operators for inclusion on their lists.
Second, if packets were prioritized based on
the type of application, applications that did-
n’t make the cut would have a strong temp-
tation to boost performance by camouflag-
ing their traffic so that it looked like the
traffic of a high-priority application, once
again sparking an unnecessary arms race. If
prioritization is the goal, itmakesmore sense
to allow users themselves (specifically, the
applications they choose to install and run)
to explicitlymark the priority of their packets
rather than having the network try to guess
the appropriate values.
Editorial Filters
Yoo argues that the explosion of content
on the Internet has made it necessary for
“telecommunications networks to exercise
editorial control.”26 Analogizing the Internet
to a cable television network, he suggests that
network owners need the ability to decide
which websites their customers visit for the
same reasons that cable operators decide
which channels to carry. He suggests that
such content selection by network owners is
analogous to the editorial policies of websites
such asGoogle or Sports Illustrated. Yooworries
that consumers will be harmed if they cannot
be provided with “editorial filters.”
This critique seems tomiss the fundamen-
tal difference between traditional cable net-
works and the Internet. Analog cable net-
works broadcast all of their channels over the
wire simultaneously. As a consequence, there
is a limit to the number of cable channels that
can be made available to the user. It is there-
fore unavoidable that someone will decide
which cable channels will be provided. In con-
trast, Internet content is transmitted only
upon user requests. As a result, there’s no
need for ISPs to pick and choose among
Internet content. They canmake all the appli-
cations and content on the Internet available,
and let the user choose.
Yoo is right about the importance of editors
to filter the avalanche of information available
on theWeb. But hemisunderstands the funda-
mental division of labor between the routers in
the core of the network and servers at the end-
points. No large network owner could build a
filtering regime that would satisfy each of its
millions of customers. At the same time, if net-
work owners respect the end-to-end principle,
users can choose fromamong the thousandsof
filters already available on the Internet. Web-
sites like Google, Digg, Sports Illustrated, or
ICanHasCheezburger help users find content
they’re interested in and weed out the rest.
There arenogood reasons for ISPs to try todis-
place this abundance of filtering options, and
good reasons to hope they don’t.
The end-to-end principle ensures that end
users have maximum control over their Inter-
net experience.Deviations fromend-to-endwill
generally reduceuserautonomybysubstituting
the network owner’s judgment for the user’s
own judgment. The arguments in favor of
doing this are unpersuasive. But Yoo and other
scholars have also argued that the end-to-end
principle has already been abandoned online.
We turn to these arguments next.
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Is the Internet
Neutral Now?
Yoo cites the “emergence of beneficial prac-
tices, such as backbone [i.e., settlement-free]
peering, content delivery networks likeAkamai,
network-based spam filtering, and blocking
websites known to be sources of viruses”27 as
examples of current networking practices that
violate the end-to-end principle. But with one
possible exception, these examples do not offer
compelling arguments for relaxing the end-to-
end principle. To understand why, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the end-to-end principle
constrainsonlytherouters“inside”thenetwork
that are responsible for routing the packets of
othercomputers.Theend-to-endprincipledoes
not constrain the behavior of network end-
points, which never handle any packets other
than their own.
As discussed above, settlement-free peering
is anarrangement inwhich twonetworksagree
to carry each others’ traffic without charge.
This typically occurs when the networks are of
roughly equal size, and so the benefits of peer-
ing to each side are approximately equal. On
the other hand,whennetworks of unequal size
connect, the smaller network will often be
required to pay the larger network to carry its
traffic.
Yoo’s concern seems tobe that thedifferent
financial treatment of large and small net-
works violates the principle that all traffic be
treated equally. But it must be remembered
that the end-to-end principle, and network
neutrality more broadly, are focused on the
technical, rather than contractual, behavior of
network owners. The end-to-end principle
requires that a network’s routers give equal
treatment to all packets that traverse the net-
work. It has nothing to say about the prices
networks charge each other for interconnec-
tion. Backbone peering simply doesn’t violate
network neutrality or the end-to-end princi-
ple, if those terms are properly understood.
Akamai
A content delivery network consists of
thousands of servers distributed around the
world that cache frequently-accessed content
on behalf of clients. For example, CNNmight
arrange for Akamai to host its video content.
Instead of downloading videos directly from
CNN’s web server, the user’s web browser
downloads the content from an Akamai-
owned server close to the user’s location.
Yoo’s argument regarding content-delivery
networks stems from a misunderstanding
about the nature of those networks. The word
“network” has a number of distinct meanings
in computer science, and a content-delivery
network is not a “network” in the same sense
that the Internet is a network. It is a network
only in the more general sense of a group of
computersworking together to achieve a com-
monpurpose. Given the confusing terminolo-
gy, it’s understandable that Yoowould assume
that “intelligence in the core of thenetwork” is
required for Akamai to work properly. But in
practice, Akamai’s servers communicate via
ordinary TCP/IP connections, and Internet
routers routeAkamai packets exactly the same
way they route any other packets.
To understand how Akamai manages this
feat, it’s helpful to knowabitmore aboutwhat
happens under the hood when a user loads a
document from the Web. The Web browser
must first translate the domain name (e.g.,
“cato.org”) into a corresponding IP address
(72.32.118.3). It does this by querying a special
computer called adomainname system (DNS)
server. Only after the DNS server replies with
the right IP address can the Web browser sub-
mit a request for the document. The process
for accessing content via Akamai is the same
except for one small difference: Akamai has
special DNS servers that return the IP address-
es of different Akamai Web servers depending
on the user’s location and the load on nearby
servers. The “intelligence”ofAkamai’s network
resides in these DNS servers.
Because this is done automatically, it may
seem to users like “the network” is engaging
in intelligent trafficmanagement. But from a
network router’s perspective, a DNS server is
just another endpoint. No special modifica-
tions are needed to the routers at the core of
10
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the Internet to get Akamai to work, and
Akamai’s design is certainly consistent with
the end-to-end principle.
Spam and Viruses
The same point applies to Yoo’s example
of spam filtering. To see why once again
requires a brief discussion of Internet archi-
tecture. From an architectural perspective, e-
mail servers are network endpoints, just like
Akamai’s Web and DNS servers. Internet
routers route e-mail packets the same way
they route any other type of packet. Although
e-mail service is sometimes bundled together
with Internet access, there is nonecessary con-
nection between the two. Indeed, many Inter-
net users use third-party e-mail access that is
not affiliated with their ISP.
One advantage of this arrangement is that
users of neutral networks can choose third-
party e-mail providers if they are dissatisfied
with the e-mail service provided by their own
ISP. In contrast, filtering e-mail at the network
level imposes one anti-spam policy on every
user, whether or not they appreciate this “ser-
vice.” Some ISPs do engage in network-level
spam filtering, but this activity is not essential
to anti-spam efforts and is arguably counter-
productive.28
The end-to-endprinciple doesnotpreclude
an ISP fromoffering spamfiltering services on
its own mail server. But it does require net-
work owners not to interfere with users who
wish to use a mail server provided by a third
party. This ensures that users who are dissatis-
fied with the anti-spam policies of their ISP’s
own e-mail service can choose another one.
Virus-infestedwebsites are a rare casewhere
a strong argument can be made for deviating
from the end-to-end principle. But it’s not dif-
ficult to draw a principled distinction between
efforts to combat viruses andmost other devi-
ations from end-to-end. Anti-virus efforts are
typically designed to protect users against
malicious strangers. That seems fundamental-
ly different from run-of-the-mill violations of
network neutrality that prioritize some legiti-
mate users or applications over others. In any
event, themost prominent network neutrality
legislation, sponsored by Sens. Olympia
Snowe (R-ME) and Byron Dorgan (D-ND),
would have prohibited only interference with
“lawful content, application or service.”29
Viruses would likely be considered illegal
applicationsunder thisdefinition.Theneed to
combat the spread of viruses, therefore, does
not seem to be a compelling argument against
leading network neutrality proposals.
Misreading RFCs
Economists RobertHahn andRobert Litan
have also claimed that adherence to the end-to-
end principle is far from universal. In a paper
for the AEI-Brookings Joint Center on
Regulation they argued that the Internet does
not follow the end-to-end principle and never
did.30 Their major evidence is found in techni-
cal documents called “requests for comments”
(RFCs) that define basic Internet protocols.
Hahn and Litan argue that at least four RFCs
appear to countenance nonneutral routing of
Internet packets. However, closer inspection of
these documents gives a very different picture.
One document,31 written in 1994, does not
describe the existing TCP/IP protocols, but a
“proposed extension to the Internet architec-
ture” that has not been widely adopted for
public Internet connectivity.32 A second, writ-
ten in 1974,33 advises host machines imple-
menting the TCP protocol to “treat incoming
packets with higher priority than outgoing
packets.” But remember that the end-to-end
principle constrains the behavior of routers in
the core of a network, not hosts at its end
points.The third,published in1981,34 specifies
that packets in the IP protocol should include
a field for priority and that this field could be
used for prioritizing packets. However, the
RFC doesn’t specify how routers should use
this information, and the field is generally
ignored by modern Internet routers. Finally,
Hahn and Litan cite another 1981 paper by
Internet pioneer Vinton Cerf that did indeed
describe a nonneutral networking scheme.35
However, the document concerns AUTODIN,
an early alternative to theTCP/IPprotocol suite
that never caught on. That a failed early com-
petitor to TCP/IP did not observe the end-to-
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end principle is certainly not evidence that the
modern Internet violates it.36
It would be overstating the case to claim
that the end-to-end principle has never been
violated. But large-scale violations of the end-
to-end principle have certainly been rare and
have almost always generated controversy.
Neutral treatment of packets by “dumb” net-
works has been the norm for a quarter centu-
ry, and there are good reasons to preserve that
arrangement. Respecting the end-to-endprin-
ciple ensures that end-users are in control of
their Internet experience, and it provides a fer-
tile environment for online innovators, who
are able to quickly and easily reach a global
audience with new content and applications.
There is a widespread assumption on both
sides of the network neutrality debate that the
Internet’s end-to-end architecture is quite frag-
ile. Many people believe that network owners
have broad powers to reshape the Internet, or
at least their own customers’ experience of it.
But this is far from true.
Customers GoneWild:
Why Ownership Doesn’t
Mean Control
Debates over regulatory policy are replete
withclaims thatnetworkownerswill—a fewsay
“should”—allow, prohibit, promote, or dis-
courage a variety of applications, devices, and
content on their networks. They can, it is imag-
ined “speedup” favoredapplications and“slow
down” disfavored applications, make some
contentmore prominent than others on users’
screens, and tilt thedirectionof theonline con-
versation inways that are congenial tonetwork
owners. Proponents of network neutrality reg-
ulations warn that this outcome will lead to a
less innovative, less useful, and less democratic
Internet. Some opponents of regulation wel-
come it, suggesting that deviations from end-
to-end can increase the efficiency of the net-
work, reducecongestion, andaccomplishother
worthwhile goals. Buthardly anyonequestions
whether companies would be able to under-
mine the Internet’s end-to-end architecture.37
Yet example after example suggests that,
in practice, the owners of large, open techno-
logical platforms have only limited control
over the use of those platforms. As Apple has
discovered with its ongoing attempts to lock
down its iPhone platform,38 customers can-
not be counted on to passively accept artifi-
cial limitations imposed by platform owners.
To the contrary, customers actively resist
such restrictions, and in many cases, plat-
form owners find themselves almost power-
less to prevent it. An example will help to
illustrate this point.
09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63
56 88 C0
In early 2007, hackers extracted a previ-
ously secret “processing key” that could be
used to unscramble commercial HD-DVD
and Blu-Ray discs without the permission of
copyright owners. This 128-bit key, which
can be represented in hexadecimal notation
as “09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63
56 88 C0,” began to circulate on the Internet.
In April, the “licensing authority” in charge
of the copy protection built into Blu-Ray and
HD-DVD discs began sending threatening
letters to website operators demanding that
the key be removed. This effort backfired, as
the threatening letters generated more pub-
licity for the key, and more people began
hosting the key on their websites.39
Soon the key appeared on Digg, a popular
online news site. Digg is unlike most other
news sites because its content is created and
selected almost entirely by Digg readers. They
submit stories to the site and vote on which
stories should appear on the front page. The
results reflect the quirky tastes of the site’s
largely young, male, tech-savvy audience, with
amixture of technology and gadget news, pol-
itics, celebrity gossip, and sophomoric humor.
Like other sites, Digg received legal demands
that the keys be removed from the site. In a
blog post on May 1, Digg CEO Jay Adelson
announced that Digg would comply with the
demands.40
Digg users regarded this decision as censor-
ship. Over the next eight hours, thousands of
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Digg users began submitting stories contain-
ing the key and voting those stories onto the
site’s front page. At one point, Digg’s entire
home page was filled with stories about the
key. Digg’s staff attempted to delete the stories
but they were simply unable to keep up. Nor
would software filters have been an effective
solutionbecauseusersbeganposting thekey in
a variety of formats that couldn’t easily have
been blocked by filters. One user picked up his
guitar and turned the key into a song. Another
user registered the key as a domain name and
posteda link to that.Othersposted imagesand
videos featuring the key. T-shirts with the key
printed on themwere offered for sale.
Just eight hours after Adelson’s initial
announcement, Digg threw in the towel. In a
later blog post that same day, Digg founder
Kevin Rose wrote that, “after seeing hun-
dreds of stories and reading thousands of
comments, you’ve made it clear. You’d rather
see Digg go down fighting than bow down to
a bigger company.”41 Rose put a brave face on
the situation, but the reality is that Digg had
no real choice. Its users had demonstrated
their determination to keep the key onDigg’s
front page. Digg’s users vastly outnumbered
its employees, and their ingenuity and deter-
mination were no match for any software
Digg could reasonably have developed.
Of course, Digg could have overhauled the
site to make it more like a more traditional
news site, in which Digg employees reviewed
stories before they were posted. But that
wouldhavebeen financial suicide.Digg’s spec-
tacular growth over the last few years was
largely thanks to the site’s unique story-selec-
tion technology. ConvertingDigg into a tradi-
tional news site would have alienated the vast
majority ofDigg’s users and severely restricted
the site’s potential for continued growth.
The paradoxical result was that although
Digg’s executives had complete physical con-
trol over its servers, it faced significant con-
straints on its ability to control what appeared
on its home page. Digg could remove any giv-
en story, ban any given user, and even install
software filters that automatically removed
content that matched certain programmati-
cally defined criteria. Yet as long as Digg
retained the user-generated editorial strategy
that had been responsible for its success, Digg
had no choice but to permit the stories its
users wanted to put there. Ownership of the
physical platformwasnograntof thepower to
control its use.
Third-Party Instant-Messaging Clients
Another good example of the kinds of chal-
lenges a network owner can expect to face if it
engages in wide-scale network discrimination
can be found in the long-running battle over
interoperability between the major instant-
messaging networks owned by Microsoft,
AOL, and Yahoo! and the developers of third-
party instant-messaging applications. As the
name suggests, instant messaging is a class of
applications that allow users to see when their
friends are online and chat with them in real
time. Yahoo!, Microsoft, and AOL all offer
clients free instant-messaging software and
maintain servers that allow these clients to
communicate.
A variety of third-party developers have
developed competing instant-messaging appli-
cations designed to be compatible with these
networks. Yahoo!, AOL, and Microsoft would
prefer that users use their own client software
instead. On several occasions in 2003 and
2004, Yahoo!made changes to its instant-mes-
sagingprotocoldesigned to shutout third-par-
ty applications.42 Microsoft and AOL made
similar efforts to block third-party IM clients
from their IM networks.43 In each case, the
developers of the third-party applications
reacted swiftly, releasing software updates
within a matter of days, if not hours, that re-
established compatibility. Indeed, over time,
the responses of the various third-party appli-
cations becamemore sophisticated and better-
coordinated. They increasingly used shared
libraries so that workarounds could be devel-
oped once and then deployed to all clients
simultaneously.
Ultimately, AOL,Microsoft, and Yahoo! all
relented. The constant software updates were
a source of irritation for users of their official
client software, and it became clear that users
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of third-party clientswerenotgoing togiveup.
Today, third-party clients such as Trillian,
Pidgin, and Adium (and newcomers like
Meebo) support all major instant-messaging
networks with the grudging acquiescence of
the networks’ operators.
To be clear, Digg and instant messaging
operate at the edges of the network, so these
controversies are not network neutrality issues
as such. But the stories suggest the kinds of
problems that ISPs would be likely to en-
counter if they attempted to restrict their cus-
tomers’ use of their Internet connections. The
TCP/IP protocols, likeDigg’s editorial process,
place a great deal of power in the hands of end
users. That power cannot bewithdrawnby fiat.
For almost a decade, broadband ISPs have
accepted a basically passive role, transmitting
the users’ packets without interfering with
themor even knowingwhat they contain. This
decentralization of responsibility has made
possible a breathtaking variety of interesting
and useful applications, including Google,
Wikipedia, World of Warcraft, AOL Instant
Messenger, the iTunes store, and millions of
others.
The assumptions of the open network are
deeply embedded in each and every one of
these applications. They are not designed for
centralized control or administration. In the
short term, network owners certainly have the
power to block any given application, just as
Digghas thepower todelete any given story or
AOL has the ability to block any given user
from its IM network. But such blunt instru-
ments aren’t likely to succeed or to serve the
network owner’s interests in the long run. As
we will see below, network owners’ efforts to
manipulateusers’ online activities are farmore
likely to generate ill will and spur the develop-
ment of workarounds than they are to foster
docile acceptance and higher profits.
Evasion for theMasses
Some advocates of government regula-
tions requiringnetworkneutrality areworried
not that cutting-edge technologies would be
blocked entirely but that network owners
might dissuade enough nontechnical users to
stunt the adoption of new, cutting-edge tech-
nologies. They worry that if only hard-core
hackers can take advantage of workarounds,
the effect will be little different than a total
block.
But one lesson of the instant-messaging
wars is that workarounds can often be quickly
integrated into user-friendly consumer prod-
ucts that are accessible to ordinary users. Even
the ragged band of volunteers and small start-
ups that developed alternative instant-messag-
ing applications early in this decade managed
to quickly develop and distribute reasonably
user-friendly applications that incorporated
the latest workarounds. Users only needed to
download an installer and double-click on it.
While there are certainly some users who can-
notmanage this feat, there are tens ofmillions
who can.
More important, a network owner launch-
ing a concerted assault on network neutrality
would face much larger, better-funded, and
more determined opponents. Major Internet
firms such as Microsoft, Apple, and Google
have a strong incentive to preserve the open
Internet. It’s not hard, for example, to imagine
Googlebundling circumvention softwarewith
the Google toolbar that’s already on millions
of Americans’ computers. And, of course,
Windows andMacOS already have automatic
software update features that could be used to
distribute workarounds. These companies
clearly understand that the erosion of the end-
to-endprinciple could leave themat themercy
of network owners. They therefore have every
incentive to design their products in ways that
shift power toward themselves or their cus-
tomers rather than to network owners.
“More Is Different”
Another challenge facing platform owners
wishing to control their users’ behavior is that
platformsbecomeprogressively harder to con-
trol as they become larger and more complex.
In his recent book, Here Comes Everybody,44
Clay Shirky writes (quoting physicist Phillip
Anderson) “more is different.” That is, the
behaviors of large, complex systems cannot
easily be predicted from the behaviors of sim-
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pler systems.
Should they try to implement new, more
discriminatory policies, the owners of net-
works are likely to find that managing a com-
plex platform with tens of millions of users is
very different from managing a simple plat-
form with tens of thousands or hundreds of
thousands of users. As a network becomes
larger and more complex, a larger, more hier-
archical, and (inevitably) more bureaucratic
organization will be needed tomanage it. And
themore control the organization attempts to
exert, the more personnel it will require and
the more acute the organizational challenges
it will face.
We have already seen the difficulties faced
by Digg and the various instant-messaging
networks when they tried to limit their users’
activities on those platforms. The Internet as
a whole is an incomparably larger,more com-
plex, and more decentralized system. If
blocking unwanted news stories from Digg
or unauthorized clients from AOL’s instant-
messaging network was difficult, blocking
undesired content or applications from the
Internet as a whole may be virtually impossi-
ble.
Of course, this isn’t to say that the major
network owners are completely powerless. In
the short run, they can certainly block any giv-
en application or website. But randomly
blocking ahandful ofwebsites or applications
is unlikely to be a profitable business strategy.
The discriminatory business models that net-
work neutrality advocates fear require a
sophisticated and comprehensive regime of
price discrimination, and it is far from clear
that it would be feasible to enforce such a
scheme for the Internet as a whole.
There are millions of small websites, appli-
cations, and content providers. For any strate-
gy of network discrimination to succeed, it
would require, at a minimum, software that
can identify and classify this heterogeneous
traffic in real time. But the sheer number and
variety of applications would make the devel-
opment of such software extremely costly. In
practice, the software would have to simply
block any traffic it didn’t recognize, which
would mean inconveniencing the millions of
customers who use one or more uncommon
applications.
As in theDigg incident, any effort by a net-
work owner to exertmore control over its por-
tion of the Internet would face determined
resistance from geek-activists who would
develop creative ways to evade the filters. Just
as Digg users transformed the AACS key into
songs and pictures to evade text-based filter-
ing, so hackers would develop software to
camouflage disfavored traffic. The sheer num-
ber of potential adversaries would make orga-
nizing an effective response a monumental
challenge.
In short, ISPs that attempt to limit their
users’ online activities are likely to learn the
same lesson that Digg did: openness is a one-
way ratchet. Once a firm cedes control to its
users, things evolve in a way that makes it
extremely difficult to reassert control. On a
closed network,most users are unaware of the
limitations being imposed on them, so they
may not agitate for more openness. But once
usershavehada taste of freedom, theybecome
acutely aware of any new restrictions and will
stubbornly resist efforts to impose them.
Network Discrimination
in the Real World
There is a common, but unstated, assump-
tion inmuchwriting about network neutrality
that the Internet’s open architecture is a fragile
system that could collapse at the first sign of
pressure.Advocatesofnewregulationspoint to
scattered examples of network owners violat-
ing the end-to-end principle and suggest that
these violations presage a more general retreat
from a nondiscriminatory network.
But such pessimism is unwarranted. On a
network with thousands of firms and hun-
dreds of millions of users, it is not surprising
that we see occasional deviations from the
end-to-end principle. But such discriminatory
policies have tended to be haphazard and rare.
They have been minor headaches for a small
number of broadband users rather than a
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threat to the Internet’s fundamental architec-
ture. And despite the recent bluster of some
telecom executives,45 efforts to undermine the
end-to-end principle do not appear to be
growingmore frequent or more ambitious.
Indeed, the Internet has a rich history of
being used in ways that were officially prohib-
ited by the network’s owners. This has been
true since the early days of the ARPANET. In
1972, a single connection to the ARPANET
could costmore than $100,000—half amillion
2008 dollars.46 Much of that cost was born by
ARPA itself, and at least on paper, use of the
network was to be restricted to ARPA-related
research projects. Yet by the mid-1970s, there
were unsanctioned mailing lists on the
ARPANET devoted to weighty topics such as
science fiction. Some such activities may have
had the tacit approval ofARPAas away of gen-
erating useful test traffic.47 But when day-to-
day operation of the network was transferred
from ARPA to the Defense Communications
Agency, military bureaucrats made a serious
effort to crack down on “frivolous” uses of the
network. For example, one 1982message from
DCA threatened to cut off sites that forwarded
an “e-mail chain letter” that had been making
the rounds.48 However, those efforts had limit-
ed success. Thanks to the network’s decentral-
ized architecture,DCA’s ability tomonitor and
control the use of its network was extremely
limited.
In a 2003 paper, Tim Wu documented a
variety of restrictions that broadbandproviders
placed on their users earlier in this decade.49
Wu’s thesis was that these restrictions were a
threat to open architecture of the Internet. But
five years later, a different conclusion suggests
itself: these restrictions, while irritating to indi-
vidual customers who have been subject to
them, have been too sporadically enforced to
havehadanyreal effectontheopencharacterof
the Internet.
For example, several cable providers pro-
hibited customers from installing home net-
working equipment or sharing their Internet
access with others outside of their premises.
The current (as of July 2008) Comcast accept-
able use policy includes a similar provision
prohibiting the use of WiFi to share Internet
access with anyone outside of the customer’s
premises. Yet there’s no way broadband
providers could possibly enforce these restric-
tions in a systematic manner. Indeed, open
WiFi networks have become quite common,
and broadband providers do not appear to be
taking action against their owners.
In addition, Comcast’s current acceptable
use policy does not allow users to “post, store,
send, transmit, or disseminate any informa-
tion or material which a reasonable person
could deem to be indecent, pornographic,
harassing, threatening, hateful, or intimidat-
ing.” Although hard data on pornography
dissemination by Comcast’s customers is
hard to come by, anecdotal evidence suggests
that this restriction is not being enforced.
Onehundredpercentof cableprovidersand
a third of DSL providers limited the operation
of servers in 2002, a restriction that continues
to appear in Comcast’s latest acceptable use
policy. And it has been at least sporadically
enforced. However, there is little reason to
think this restriction has been a significant
obstacle to thedevelopmentof innovative serv-
er software. First, there is a vibrant market for
third-party hosting services, with prices as low
as$10permonth.50This iswellwithin thebud-
get of anyone wanting to host his or her own
content. Second, even those ISPs that ban the
useof traditional servers generallypermit (with
some exceptions discussed below) the use of
consumer applications, such as peer-to-peer
applications, that have server-like characteris-
tics. Most users do not want to run their own
Webor e-mail servers, andwouldbeunlikely to
do so even if it were permitted. But when a sig-
nificant number of users have begun to use
applications thatperformserver-like roles, ISPs
have generally not classified them as servers or
attempted to restrict their use.
The Comcast Kerfuffle
Probably the most clear-cut example of a
recent attack on network neutrality was last
year’s revelation that Comcast had been
interfering with peer-to-peer file sharing traf-
fic. In October, the Associated Press con-
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firmed rumors that had been circulating on
the Internet for months that Comcast was
actively interfering with its customers’ use of
BitTorrent and similar peer-to-peer file shar-
ing applications. TheAP reported, and others
subsequently confirmed, that Comcast’s net-
work would sometimes send forged “reset”
packets to both ends of a peer-to-peer con-
nection, effectively telling each end of the
connection that the other had hung up.51
Comcast is reportedly using software manu-
factured by a company called Sandvine to
perform this feat.52
Comcast’s defenders argued that this poli-
cy is necessary to combat congestion on its
network. Those arguments weren’t totally
implausible. Peer-to-peer activity constitutes a
large fraction of online traffic, and the net-
working technology currently in use by
Comcast is designed for fast downloads at the
cost of slow uploads. Comcast argues that
peer-to-peer traffic can place unique stresses
on its asymmetrical network.
Comcast’s blocking didn’t just affect the
heaviest BitTorrent users who were download-
ing gigabytes of illicit movies and music. Even
BitTorrent users engaged in totally innocuous
(and relatively low-bandwidth) activities like
downloading the latest bug fixes for the online
game World of Warcraft could be affected.53
And in an apparent misconfiguration, Sand-
vine also appears to have interfered with the
popular Lotus Notes business software.54
Comcast’s activities attracted considerable
public attention. Comcast scrambled to ex-
plain its actions and insist (somewhat mis-
leadingly) that customers will continue to
“enjoy unfettered access to all the content, ser-
vices, and applications that the Internet has to
offer.”55 Comcast’s competitors have relished
the opportunity to tout their own, less dis-
criminatory, network policies. Verizon, whose
recent investments in fiber-optic lines give it
significantly more bandwidth than Comcast,
has crowed that its “more robust” network
makes such filtering unnecessary. Verizon also
took a shot at Comcast’s secretive policies by
pledging to let customersknowbefore it filters
traffic in the future.56
But the most important development was
the reaction of BitTorrent users themselves. In
early 2006, BitTorrent developers began
adding encryption features to BitTorrent
clients todefeat traffic-shaping tools.57Within
days of the AP story, BitTorrent users began
swapping tips for evading Comcast’s blocks.
Most BitTorrent software supports a tech-
nique called “header encryption” that makes
BitTorrent packets difficult for filtering soft-
ware to identify.58 The primary long-run effect
ofComcast’s interferencewithBitTorrent traf-
fic won’t be a reduction in that traffic, but
simply more rapid adoption of encrypted ver-
sions of the BitTorrent protocol.
For a variety of reasons, including user
resistance, negative publicity, and regulatory
pressure, Comcast backed away from its dis-
criminatory policy in March. It reached an
agreementwith BitTorrent, Inc., the company
founded by BitTorrent creator Bram Cohen,
to stop interfering with BitTorrent traffic. In
return, BitTorrent agreed to work with Com-
cast to make the BitTorrent protocol “more
efficient.” Comcast pledged to implement an
end-to-end-friendly traffic-shaping regime by
the end of 2008.59 By the time the FCC
released a ruling on Comcast’s behavior in
July, the issue had already been rendered a
moot point by technological and market
developments.60
For all of its technical sophistication,
Sandvine is still a relatively blunt instrument.
No doubt some of its specific flaws will be
fixed. But no amount of tinkering with a tool
like Sandvine could give Comcast the kind of
comprehensive control over its network that
network neutrality advocates have warned
about. Sandvine requires Comcast to describe
the types of traffic it wishes to block in specif-
ic, technical terms. Yet the types of control net-
work neutrality advocates hope to trumpwith
regulation—“don’t waste bandwidth,” “don’t
share copyrighted files,” or “don’t use content
or applications that compete with our affili-
ates”—are not based on technical criteria. They
are business criteria that would require con-
stant tweaking by an army of network engi-
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neers to implement andmaintain. Regulation
is not needed to frustrate such controls. The
open architecture of the Internet is sufficient.
Interfering with BitTorrentmay have given
some short-term relief toComcast’s aging net-
work while the company upgrades to a new,
higher-speed networking technology called
DOCSIS 3.0.61 But as Comcast evidently real-
ized, it would not have worked asmore than a
stop-gap strategy. Over time, the vast majority
of peer-to-peer userswouldhave either learned
how to evade Comcast’s filters or shifted to
competing firms such as Verizon that offer
unfiltered Internet access.
At a minimum, it’s clear that Comcast’s
practical ability to control its users’ online
activities is sharply constrained by technical
and economic forces. Comcast’s ability to exert
fine-grained control over its users is much
more limited than some network neutrality
advocates fear.
Assessing the Threat to
End-to-End
One of the challenges of evaluating the
case for network neutrality regulation is that
every supporter of new regulation seems to
have a different idea about the types of dis-
crimination that network owners are most
likely to undertake. Some analysts suggest
that network owners will focus narrowly on
degrading applications, such as Internet tele-
phony, that compete with their legacy busi-
nesses. Others suggest that they will under-
take a broad scheme of price discrimination
in which virtually every online application
would face a choice between degraded service
and higher fees. Still others are worried about
risks of censorship.
One of the clearest statements of the sce-
nario network neutrality advocates are con-
cerned about was voiced by EdWhitacre, then
the CEO of SBC (which soon became AT&T).
In a 2005 interview with Business Week,
Whitacre created a firestorm of controversy
when he argued that large Internet firms like
Google, Vonage, and MSN should pay his
company for the privilege of reaching SBC’s
customers. In an unusually candid moment,
Whitacre stated “what they would like to do is
usemy pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them
do that because we have spent this capital and
we have to have a return on it. So there’s going
to have to be some mechanism for [firms like
Microsoft, Google, andVonage]whouse these
pipes to pay for the portion they’re using.”62
Onemodel of this kind of network discrimi-
nationwas fleshedoutbyHarvard lawprofessor
Yochai Benkler in his widely cited 2006 book,
The Wealth of Networks,63 which examines the
social, economic, and political consequences of
the growth of the Internet and digital technolo-
giesmore generally.He argues that private own-
ership of communications infrastructure—even
in a competitive market—threatens the open
character of the Internet, which in turn threat-
ens both innovation and free speech.64
Figure 1 illustrates Benkler’s simple model
for a world without network neutrality regula-
tion. In this model, D might be a major
Internet service provider, Amight be a residen-
tial broadband customer, and B and C might
be competing website operators. Benkler
argues that this setup gives D control over A’s
“information environment,” raising three fun-
damental concerns about this arrangement:
First, D is in a position to charge B and C
unreasonable prices to communicate with A.
Second, D is in a position to sign an exclusive
contractwithBguaranteeing thatB’smessages
reachAbut someor all ofC’s donot. Finally,D
may be able to alter messages to or from A as
they pass through D’s network, thereby mis-
leading ormanipulating A for the benefit of D
or another party’s benefit.65
In this simplified model, it seems self-evi-
dent that D has almost unlimited power over
A’s online experience. If B or C wants to
transmit amessage that D feels is contrary to
its interests, D can fail to deliver the message
or even alter the message to suit its purposes.
No doubt, Benkler would acknowledge
that this is a greatly simplified model for the
real-world Internet. He recognizes that D’s
ability to manipulate A is limited by “the
degree towhich it is hardor easy to get around
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D’s facility,” and he also argues that the “the
degree of transparency” of D’s manipulations
is important.66
But Benkler nevertheless underestimates
the ability of users to detect when a network
owner ismanipulating their traffic. He writes
that
there are many reasons that different
sites load at different speeds, or even fail
to load altogether. Users, the vastmajor-
ity of whom are unaware that the
provider could, if it chose, regulate the
flow of information to them, will as-
sume that it is the target site that is fail-
ing,not that their ownserviceprovider is
manipulating what they can see.67
As we have just seen, Comcast’s actions
were relatively subtle and narrowly targeted
BitTorrent, a relatively obscure and unpopu-
lar protocol. Yet it took only a handful of
tech-savvy users to pinpoint which carriers
were blocking traffic and how they were
doing it, and that information was picked up
by the mainstream media and widely publi-
cized.
Benkler also suggests that D’s control over
A’s “information environment” would be so
complete that D could prevent nontechnical
users like A from even learning about D’s
manipulation. But in the real world, even a
broadband monopolist won’t have a monop-
oly on the spread of information. People have
dozens of information sources, including
broadcast television and radio, newspapers,
magazines, cable and satellite television, tele-
phones, and face-to-face conversation. In the
real world, D’s ability to control A’s “informa-
tion environment” is destroyed by the multi-
plicity of alternative information sources.
Theoretical models can be useful when
they remove extraneous details and focus the
reader’s attention on the essential characteris-
tics of a problem. And at first glance, it seems
obvious that party D in Figure 1 (say, AT&T)
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A Simple Model of Communications Networks Inspired by Yochai Benkler
Source: Cato Institute.
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can charge party B (Google, Microsoft, or a
Web startup) for access toA (a broadband cus-
tomer). But the simplifications of Benkler’s
model obscure more than they illuminate.
A more realistic model of the Internet is
presented in Figure 2. Two new parties, E and
F, have been added, and B and C have been
moved so that they now receive their connec-
tion to D (and, indirectly, to A) through
them. Here, D might represent a broadband
provider like AT&T, and E and F might rep-
resent competitive backbone providers like
Global Crossing or Level 3. At first glance,
this might not seem to change D’s bargain-
ing position at all. D is still the exclusive gate-
keeper for traffic to A. D can still selectively
block messages from B to A, and D can still
accept payments from B to block messages
from C to A.
However, the picture has changed in sev-
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eral important ways. As noted previously,
more is often different. If F had only a hand-
ful of customers, it would be feasible for D to
approach each of them and credibly threaten
to disconnect them from D’s customers if
they didn’t pay up. But as the number and
variety of F’s customers grows, logistical con-
cerns become more and more significant. D
doesn’t have a direct contractual relationship
to C, and C’s traffic to A is intermingled with
the traffic of F’s other customers. F has no
particular reason to inform D when C joins
the network, nor to furnishDwith contact or
billing information for C.
To illustrate, this author contributes to the
Technology Liberation Front,68 a small group
blog that is administered by a friend who runs
a small web-design business. The site generates
a negligible amount of advertising revenue and
has no employees. The amount of revenue a
major backbone provider could extract from
the blog would be too small to even recoup the
costs of classifying the site, identifying the site’s
owner, obtaining contact information, dis-
cussing the payment options with the site’s
owner, and so forth. Not only would it be a
waste of money for a network owner to try to
extortmoney from theblog, the site’s contribu-
tors would respond by publicly ridiculing that
network provider.
This small example would be multiplied
hundreds of thousands of times if a network
owner were to approach sites with a wide
variety of business models, organizational
structures, and financial situations for pay-
ment. A lot of sites, especially the small ones,
would credibly refuse to pay a dime.
That would create a chicken-and-egg
problem. To return to Figure 2, D’s primary
revenue source is A and A’s cohorts, who pay
D for the ability to communicate with C and
other customers of F. D cannot block all of
F’s customers (who might collectively repre-
sent a significant fraction of all content on
the Web) from reaching A without sparking
cancellations—if not lawsuits—from its own
customers. But C won’t be inclined to pay D
unless C believes D’s threat to cut off C is
credible. C knows that D’s threat won’t
become credible until a significant number
of F’s other customers have paid the fees D
has demanded. So although D may make a
lot of threats, it will be relatively obvious that
D can never actually pull the trigger and cut
its own customers off from thousands of
websites.
Thegraph inFigure2hasan important sym-
metry. D, E, and F are “Tier 1” backbone pro-
viders. The Internet has approximately nine
“Tier 1” network owners that peer with one
anotheronasettlement-freebasis.69Smallernet-
workownerspayoneormoreof thesecarriers to
carry at least some of their traffic. A randomly
selected pair of Internet userswillmost often be
connectedviadifferentbackboneproviders, and
the path between them will therefore traverse a
settlement-freepeeringpoint. So it is reasonable
to take this as the typical case.
Dneeds access to F’s customers roughly as
much as F needs access to D’s customers.
Moreover, F has a strong incentive to thwart
any effort by D to charge its own customers
for interconnection, because that would put
F at a serious competitive disadvantage in the
competition for the business of customers
like B and C. F will be strongly motivated to
organize a “common front” with E againstD.
If necessary, F is likely to provide legal, public
relations, and perhaps even direct financial
support to any customers that are targeted by
D in order to ensure that D’s efforts fail.
In the face of well-organized opposition, it
is extremely unlikely that D would be able to
extract payments from enough of F’s cus-
tomers tomake credible a threat to cut off the
rest. And that, in turn, means that C will have
no particular incentive to comply with D’s
demands. This is especially true because C
would know that if it agreed to pay D for
access to D’s customers, numerous other ISPs
would demand similar terms for themselves.
From C’s perspective, being temporarily cut
off from D’s network would be far preferable
to signaling to the world that it was suscepti-
ble to such bullying.
In the event of a prolonged standoff, in
whichDblockedCfromaccess toA, it is almost
certain that D would blink first. Such a move
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would generate enormous amounts of positive
publicity for C and negative publicity for D. It
would likely spark customer cancellations, and
perhaps even lawsuits based on false advertis-
ing, breach of contract, or the like. A prolonged
standoff would do tremendous damage to D’s
reputation and considerable damage to its bot-
tom line. Indeed, if C were significantly smaller
than D, C might even relish the opportunity to
be cast in a David-and-Goliath battle with D.
Anyone who got their Internet access from
someone other than D would still be able to
reach C, and it’s likely that C’s total traffic
would grow as thousands of people came to
learnmore about the site Dwas so determined
to block.
Whitacre’s successors at AT&T would no
doubt love to charge the Googles and eBays of
the world for the privilege of accessing AT&T’s
broadband customers. But the structure of the
Internet simply doesn’t giveAT&T the leverage
to do so. AT&T needs Google and eBay (and
millions of smaller websites) as much as they
need it.
Exclusive Access
Another way Benkler suggests D might
profit from its exclusive connection to A is by
accepting payments from B to limit commu-
nication between A and C. In this case, B and
C might be competitors, and A might be an
existing customer of C’s online service. B
might calculate that it could pay D to cut off
(or slow down) A’s connection to C and there-
by win A’s business.
Just stating the proposal in those terms
makes the first difficulty clear: A is going to
wonder why he is suddenly unable to reach C,
and once the media report that it’s because B
paid D to cut off access, he’s not going to be
enthusiastic about becoming a customer of B.
Indeed, it’s likely that such amove would lead
a significant number of B’s customerswho are
not connected through D to switch to C in
protest. As in the previous case, becoming the
target of a deliberate block by D would be a
tremendous publicity coup for C.
Moreover, B doesn’t simply want to block
access toC. B probably wants to block access to
anyone offering a site that competes with B. If,
for example,B isanonlinevideosite,Bwillwant
to ask D to block all competing online video
sites. Initially, thatwillbeeasy:Bcanjustprovide
Dwith a list of themajor competing video sites,
and D can institute a block based on the rele-
vant IP addresses. But preserving B’smonopoly
on online videowould growmore difficult over
time. B’s competitors are likely to begin looking
for ways to route around D’s block. B or D
wouldneed to expendconsiderable resources to
track and counter those efforts and ensure that
competing video services remain inaccessible.
Not only would preventing the emergence of
new video applications likely be far more trou-
ble that it’sworth in the long run, but each time
a new site got blocked it would create a new
wave of negative publicity highlighting the
inadequacies of B’s product.
Free Speech
Benkler also worries that by interfering
with a customer’s communications, a network
provider would be able to manipulate that
customer’s “information environment” and
thereby skew theuser’s viewof theworld.70 For
example, a conservative network owner might
arrange things so that it would be easier for its
customers to reach conservative-leaning blogs
and news sites and harder for customers to
reach liberal-leaning ones. However, Benkler
never explains in any detail how the network
owner would accomplish such a feat, and the
Internet has strong built-in safeguards against
network owners manipulating online content
without the user’s knowledge. The fundamen-
tal safeguard is the vast amount of content
available on the Internet. Manipulating
human communications effectively can only
be performed by other human beings, and no
company in the world has enough manpower
to review every blog post, YouTube video, pod-
cast, and e-mail on the Internet. Even evaluat-
ing every website in order to create a content-
based blacklist would be a Herculean task.
Moreover, even if a company had the man-
powerrequiredtoevaluateall thecontentonthe
Internet, it’s not at all obvious what techniques
would be available to manipulate customers.
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Benkler suggests that network owners might
“make some sites and statements easier to reach
and see—more prominently displayed on the
screen, faster to load.”71 But thatwouldn’tmake
a lot of sense. Slowing down a user’s access to
Paul Krugman is unlikely to cause the user to
read Michelle Malkin instead. And there’s no
obvious way to gracefully yet surreptitiously
makeawebsite “moreprominentlydisplayedon
the screen,” since users directly control which
websites they visit. Users would surely notice if
their ISP somehow began causing unwanted
websites to popup on their screens.
Even if all of these technical and logistical
hurdles could be overcome, there remains a
fundamental problem of backlash. Benkler
suggests that such techniques would be “sub-
tle,” but they would in fact be nothing of the
sort. No widescale manipulation would go
unnoticed for very long. There are a variety of
network diagnostic tools that can be used to
analyze response times from various parts of
the Internet and determine the source of the
interference.72
As we saw with the Digg/AACS incident,
when a powerful individual or organization
tries to suppress speech it dislikes, it tends to
trigger what Techdirt blogger Mike Masnick
hasdubbed the “StreisandEffect,” namedafter
an aerial photo of actress Barbara Streisand’s
house that became famous after the media
extensively covered her lawsuit seeking to have
it removed fromthe Internet.73 In2006,dozens
of high-traffic blogs reported on allegations
that Kentucky state employees had been
blocked from viewing a liberal-leaning blog on
state computers.74 The outrage over that rela-
tively petty censorship pales in comparison to
the firestorm of controversy that would be
unleashed if amajor network owner embarked
on a systematic campaign of censorship on its
network.
We don’t have to speculate on what such a
backlashwould look like.We have only to look
at the controversy over Verizon Wireless’s deci-
sion to deny a pro-choice group access to an
SMS “short code,” a number used to send and
receive text messages. The decision attracted
near-universal condemnation that forced
Verizon to back down a week later.75 This was
not a true network neutrality issue, but it’s a
good illustration of the potency of public opin-
ion when large companies are perceived to be
interfering with free speech. The backlash
againstacompanyengaging indeliberate,wide-
scale censorship on the Internet would be even
more severe.
The Role of Competition
It’s worth noting that none of the argu-
ments in the preceding sections require a sig-
nificant amount of competition in the residen-
tialbroadbandindustry.Mostof thedifficulties
that network owners would encounter if they
deviated from the end-to-end principle would
exist even if they had a monopoly of Internet
access.Monopolists generally seek tomaximize
profits. Discriminatory strategies that reduce
the value of the network without generating
significant revenues are going to be money-
losers whether or not the network owner holds
a last-milemonopoly.
Of course, these arguments are even stronger
in places where there is a broadband “duopoly.”
And they will be stronger still if new technolo-
gies—for example, broadband over power lines,
WiMax, or higher-speed Internet access via the
recently auctioned 700 MHz spectrum—intro-
duceathirdorfourthbroadbandoptiontoasig-
nificant number of consumers. But even in the
currentmarket environmentof relatively limited
competition, broadband providers would still
find it difficult to undermine the end-to-end
principle.
Some of the arguments above do assume a
robust and competitive market for wholesale
access to the Internet backbone. Luckily, there
is ample competition in thismarket,with com-
petitive “tier one” backbone providers such as
Level 3 and Global Crossing competing on a
roughly level playing fieldwith the largest “last
mile” broadband providers.
End-to-End and the Incentive to Innovate
Hundreds of Internet-based startups are
founded each year in the hopes that they will
be the next Yahoo!, eBay, or Google. Startup
founders work long hours and take great per-
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sonal risk to build their firms. Many network
neutrality advocates worry that Internet dis-
crimination could deter the creation of new
startups and slow the pace of high-tech inno-
vation.76 As mentioned previously, the Inter-
net’s open architecture allows firms to enter
the market without seeking the approval of
the hundreds of companies that control the
various networks that collectivelymake up the
Internet. If the Internet were transformed into
a proprietary network, that would certainly
slow the creation of online startup firms.
But it is overstating the case to suggest that
even sporadic interference with the end-to-end
principle, such as Comcast’s interference with
BitTorrent, significantly reduces the incentives
for online innovation. The sheer number of
startup firms gives them a kind of “safety in
numbers.” The typical startup’s odds of being
targeted by amajor network provider are quite
low.Moreover, the fact that dozens of different
companies own significant parts of the Inter-
net’s infrastructure means that even those
firms unlucky enough to be targeted by one
network provider will still be able to reach the
vast majority of Internet users via other net-
works. To be sure, such discrimination would
be a headache for these firms, but a relatively
small chance of being cut off from a minority
of residential customers isunlikely to rankvery
high on an entrepreneur’s list of worries.
There is, in short, little reason to believe
that network owners will find it profitable to
block or degrade content or applications on
their networks. Openness is a one-way ratch-
et, and the end-to-end principle has devel-
oped sufficient inertia over the last three
decades that it will be extremely difficult for
network owners to displace it.
The Fast Lane and
theWalled Garden
Thus far, we have considered scenarios in
which incumbent broadband providers
could intentionally degrade the performance
of disfavored applications or content, and we
have seen that such degradation is unlikely to
be profitable for network owners. We now
consider the flipside of this strategy: an ISP
that maintains a baseline level of connectivi-
ty for all applications and content, but selec-
tively provides enhanced connectivity for
applications or content owned with the net-
work owner or its partners.
In this “fast lane” scenario, colorfully de-
scribed in dozens of popular accounts over the
last twoyears, the Internetwouldbedividedup
into two“lanes.”77TheGoogles andMicrosofts
of theworldwould enjoy speedy delivery in the
“fast lane.” Everyone else’s traffic would be rel-
egated to the “slow lane.” Activists worry that
this will stifle innovation, as only the select few
who can pay the freight on the “fast lane” will
be able to deliver next-generation services,
while everyone else’s online offerings stagnate.
Suchastrategywouldnotposea short-term
threat to the Internet’s end-to-endarchitecture.
Existingapplicationswouldenjoy the same lev-
el of bandwidth they had always enjoyed and
would continue to operate normally. New
applications that required only today’s level of
network performance would be able to launch
without difficulty. That, in turn, means that if
a “fast lane” strategy required regulatory inter-
vention, policymakers would have plenty of
time to study the problemand craft a response
after the fact.
The fundamental difficulty of the “fast
lane” strategy is that a network owner pursu-
ing such a strategywould be effectively forego-
ing the enormous value of the unfiltered con-
tent and applications that comes “for free”
with unfiltered Internet access. The unfiltered
Internet already offers a breathtaking variety
of innovative content and applications, and
there is every reason to expect things to get
even better as the available bandwidth contin-
ues to increase. Those ISPs that continue to
provide their users with faster, unfiltered
access to the Internet will be able to offer all of
this content to their customers, enhancing the
value of their pipe at no additional cost to
themselves.
In contrast, ISPs that choose not to upgrade
their customers’ Internet access but instead
devotemorebandwidth toaproprietary “walled
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garden” of affiliated content and applications
will have to actively recruit each application or
content provider that participates in the “fast
lane” program. In fact, this is precisely the strat-
egy thatAOLundertookduring the1990s.AOL
was initiallyaproprietaryonlineservice, charged
bythehour, thatalloweditsuserstoaccessAOL-
affiliatedonlinecontent.Over time,AOLgradu-
ally made it easier for its customers to access
contentontheInternet, sothatbytheendof the
1990s, it was viewed primarily as an Internet
Service Provider that happened to offer some
proprietary applications and content as well.78
The fundamental problem requiring AOL to
change was that the content available on the
Internet grew so rapidly that AOL (and other
proprietary services like CompuServe) couldn’t
keepup.AOL finally threw in the towel in 2006,
announcing that the proprietary services that
had once formed the core of its online offerings
would become just another ad-supported web-
site.79 A “walled garden/slow lane” strategy has
already proven unprofitable in themarketplace.
Regulations prohibiting such a business model
would be surplusage.
Large, hierarchical organizations face great
difficulties keeping up with the innovation of
a decentralized, open platform. The inherent
frictions inmanaging and expanding apropri-
etary online servicemakes it virtually impossi-
ble for the owner of a “walled garden” to inno-
vate as rapidly as thousands of companies
competing on an open platform. Even a firm
as large andwell-capitalized asAT&T,Verizon,
or Comcast will have difficulty developing a
stable of content and applications that will be
as appealing as the content and applications
available on the unfettered Internet.
Indeed, as Chris Yoo has pointed out,80 the
merger of AOL and Time Warner in 2001 was
conceived as just such a vertically integrated
network/content juggernaut. Themerged firm
proved to be an anemic competitor. As impres-
sive as Time Warner’s stable of content was, it
wasdwarfedby the content already available on
theopenInternet.AOL’sdial-updivisionsimply
couldnothaveaffordedtocutoff its customers’
access to unaffiliated Internet content, because
doing so would have dramatically reduced the
value of its online offering.
Of course, in some areas, consumers may
not have the option of purchasing unfettered
access to the Internet, either because they have
only one broadband provider, or because both
broadband providers in their area are pursu-
ing “walled garden” strategies. But even in
those areas, several factors will create pressure
on ISPs to provide full-speed Internet access
alongside their “walled garden” services. First,
even a monopolist has an incentive to maxi-
mize the monopoly rents he can extract. If a
high-speed connection to the unfiltered Inter-
net is significantlymore valuable to customers
than access to thewalled garden, then offering
unfiltered Internet access will be a revenue-
maximizing strategy even in the absence of
competition. Indeed, the incentive is likely to
grow over time, as the content on the unfil-
tered Internet gets further and further ahead
ofwhat is availablewithin the “walledgarden.”
This is evenmore true in a “duopoly” situa-
tion, in which an area is served by both a cable
andaphone incumbent, andbotharepursuing
a “walled garden” approach. Each firm would
have a powerful incentive to “break ranks” and
increase the speed of their unfiltered Internet
access, thereby attracting a significant number
of customers from the other carrier. Moreover,
because of the patchwork nature of the cable
and phone companies’ service areas, almost
every large incumbent phone company has sev-
eral cable competitors in parts of its service ter-
ritory, and vice versa. For a variety of practical
reasons, ISPs are unlikely to offer unfiltered
Internet access to some of its customers and
limitothercustomers toa“walledgarden,” soas
long as they face competition from the unfil-
tered Internet in a significant number of mar-
kets, they will have good reasons to continue
offering it across their service areas.
High-Definition Video
The “walled garden” strategy is almost al-
waysdescribedintermsofhigh-definitionvideo,
because that’s currently the most important
application for which existing Internet connec-
tion speeds are inadequate. Those who fear a
“two-tieredInternet”worrythatcarrierswill find
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itmore profitable to devotemost of their band-
width to a handful of large media companies—
whose content can be sold at a significant
markup—than to allow consumers to use that
bandwidth to freely access any content on the
Internet.
The problem with this theory is that many
broadband networks already have a proprietary
“fast lane” forvideo: cable television.Cable firms
havealways allocated thebulkof thebandwidth
ontheircoaxialcablestovideotransmission,not
Internet access. Recently, Verizon and AT&T
have been rolling out proprietary video services
of their own. While originally, cable television
was an analog service that was dramatically dif-
ferent frommoderndatanetworks, cable opera-
torshavebeensteadilymovingtoInternet-based
technologies. AT&T’s U-Verse video service, for
example, will reportedly be based on TCP/IP
networking technologies.
We have a lot of experience with the eco-
nomicsofproprietaryvideonetworks, andthere
is no reason to think that broadband firms
could generate significant revenues by selling
“fast lane” access to HD-video producers. In-
deed, on cable television networks, the money
flows the other way, with the network owner
paying the content provider for the privilege of
carrying its content.81There’snothingabout the
transitiontoTCP/IP-basedcontentdeliverythat
would strengthen the network owners’ bargain-
ing position enough to cause the payments to
begin flowing in the opposite direction.
Of course, partisans for open networks
would prefer that 100 percent of the available
bandwidth be allocated to unfiltered Internet
access. But cable and telephone incumbents
have already invested billions of dollars in
video-on-demand infrastructure. Legislation
requiring all cable and telephone bandwidth
to be reallocated to public Internet connec-
tivity would be a nonstarter politically as a
transparent seizure of private investment.
The leading network neutrality proposal of
2006, known as Snowe-Dorgan,82 explicitly
exempted cable television services from net-
work neutrality requirements. Legislation
requiring data networks to be nondiscrimi-
natory will have no impact on the amount of
bandwidth devoted to proprietary—and net-
work-neutrality-exempt—video services.
It would be overstating the case to suggest
that no ISP will attempt a “walled garden”
strategy and construct a “fast lane” to promote
its success.But the Internet isnot so fragile that
a few “walled gardens” pose a threat to its vital-
ity. The Internet is much bigger than any one
networkowner, andunder any conceivable sce-
nario, there will continue to be hundreds of
millions of people with unfettered, high-speed
access to the open Internet.Walled gardens are
likely to prove anemic, unprofitable, and (as a
consequence) short-lived. And because a “fast
lane” strategy is unlikely to interfere with exist-
ing Internet applications, policymakers can
afford to wait until any problem manifests
itself before taking action.
To summarize, network neutrality support-
ers have suggested twobasicways thatnetwork
owners might profit from undermining the
end-to-end principle. One strategy involves
threatening todegradeorblockapplicationsor
content as a way of getting Internet firms to
pay extra for unfettered access to their cus-
tomers. The other strategy involves selling ac-
cess to a proprietary “fast lane” that gives pref-
erential treatment to affiliated applications or
content. While it’s not inconceivable that net-
work owners will try either or both of these
strategies, they are likely to prove unprofitable
and as a result will be short-lived.
Government regulation to protect the Inter-
net’s end-to-end architecture is unnecessary
because a variety of nonregulatory forces are
sufficient to prevent it. But if network neutrali-
ty regulationweremerely unnecessary, itmight
make sense to enact it anyway just to be on the
safe side. History suggests that regulation is
likely to prove not only unnecessary but harm-
ful as well.
The Deregulation
Revolution
In the first half of the 20th century, the
study of government regulation was domi-
nated by a collection of ideas that came to be
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known as the “public interest” theory of reg-
ulation. Under the influence of Progressive
theories of political economy, New Deal–era
economists and policymakers had great con-
fidence in the ability of expert government
regulators to correct perceived market fail-
ures through active intervention in market
processes.83
They created or strengthened numerous
regulatory agencies; three of the most impor-
tant are the agencies that collectively oversaw
the nation’s transportation and communica-
tions infrastructure: the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Federal Communications
Commission, and theCivilAeronauticsBoard.
But then in the 1960s and 1970s—at the same
time that computer scientists were developing
the infrastructure and ideas that would power
the Internet—another intellectual revolution
occurred in the public policy world. The result
was a dramatic deregulation that has had pro-
found effects on the American economy.
A bit of history about these agencies is
crucial to understanding the intellectual rev-
olution of the 1970s and its implications for
today’s regulatory debates.
The Interstate Commerce Commission
The Interstate Commerce Commission
emerged from a debate strikingly similar to
today’snetworkneutralitydebate. In the1880s,
the railroadswereanew, vibrant industry in the
process of transforming the Ameri-can econo-
my. Activists became alarmed at their rapidly
increasing size and power.
Congress responded in 1887 with the Inter-
state Commerce Act, which created the first
modern regulatory agency, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. Using language strikingly
similar to modern network neutrality propos-
als, the ICA prohibited the railroads from
charging different rates for “like and contem-
poraneousservice in the transportationofa like
kind of traffic under substantially similar cir-
cumstances and conditions.” It also prohibited
giving “undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage” to any particular customers. Com-
plaints regarding violations of these rules could
be directed to the ICC or directly to the courts.
This was intended to protect consumers and
the public frompowerful companies.
But the man President Cleveland chose as
the first ICCchairman,ThomasM.Cooley,was
a railroad ally,84 and ICC regulation of the rail-
roads was relatively weak under his tenure.85
The ICCwas rendered evenmore impotentby a
waveof litigationthatengulfedthecommission
in the1890s.Courtsbegansecond-guessing the
rates the ICC tried to impose on the railroads,
and Cooley began to worry that the railroads
would ignore the ICC’s decisions entirely.86 The
commission reached a low point in 1897 when
the SupremeCourt denied that it had been giv-
en the power to set rates at all.87 The ICC was
regarded as basically toothless for the next few
years.88
Congress beefed up the commission’s
authority in 1903, 1906, and 1910.89 But even
after doubts about its legal authority were
laid to rest, the ICC pursued a policy of gen-
eral timidity, leaving in place discriminatory
rate-making policies that had become long
established and that had the support of pow-
erful interest groups. The commission did
reject a few rate increases in the years leading
up to World War I, but in general, the ICC
used “its considerable strength to preserve
the status quo.”90
Things gotmuchworse after thewar, as fed-
eral railroad regulation took on an overtly pro-
tectionist cast. In 1920, any pretense of protect-
ingconsumerswasdropped,asCongresspassed
legislation giving the ICC thepower to establish
minimumaswell asmaximum rates.91 In 1935,
Congress reacted to “cutthroat” competition
from truckers by extending the commission’s
authority to that industry aswell.92 ICC author-
ity was extended towater shipping in 1940.93
For the next 40 years, the commission effec-
tively operated a cartel for the benefit of trans-
portation interests. In1970, a report releasedby
aRalphNadergroupdescribedthecommission
as “primarily a forum at which transportation
interests divide up the national transportation
market.”94Notonlywere consumersharmedby
unnecessarily high prices, but economic effi-
ciencywasunderminedbecause the ICCmicro-
managed the firms’ activities, dictating which
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routes they could serve and what cargo they
could carry, meaning that competition could
not drive down price and drive up quality. In
many cases, truckswould carry cargo to a desti-
nation and then return empty because they
were unable to secure permission from the ICC
to carry cargo on the return trip.
The Civil Aeronautics Board
The ICC approach to regulation was at its
zenith during the New Deal, and the commis-
sion served as a model for other regulatory
bodies created during the period.One example
is the Civil Aeronautics Board, which governed
commercial aviation, taking a protectionist
stance almost from its creation in 1938. In
1941, “the board first enunciated what was to
be its philosophy on new entrants: the present
number of carriers in air transportation was
deemed sufficient to protect against monop-
oly, and any future expansion of air trans-
portation would be best accomplished by the
certification of presently operating air carri-
ers.”95 In short, the CABworked to exclude new
competitors.
For the next 40 years, the CAB regulated
the airline industry much the way the ICC
regulated surface transportation. Both agen-
cies were charged with the seemingly impos-
sible task of simultaneously promoting the
interests of consumers and incumbent firms.
More often than not, consumers lost, as reg-
ulated firms cultivated cozy relationships
with the regulators and used their influence
to limit competition and raise prices.
The Federal Communications
Commission
A more complicated case is the story of
the telephone industry, but there too regula-
tion ultimately worked as a barrier to compe-
tition. The FCC’s efforts to protect telecom
incumbents from competition took decades
to break down.
Scholars disagree about the extent to which
government regulation contributed to AT&T’s
initial dominance of the telephony market,96
butall agree thatafter thenationalizationof the
telephone network duringWorldWar I, AT&T
had a de facto monopoly on telephone service
in the United States. This monopoly was for-
malized with the passage of the 1934
CommunicationsAct, whichput the newly cre-
ated Federal Communications Commission in
charge of regulating the Bell system.97
In 1942, the FCC responded to what it
regarded as AT&T’s excessive long-distance
profits by requiring AT&T’s long-distance
operation to make payments to the Bell sub-
sidiaries that provided local service.98 Over the
next three decades, the FCC required long-dis-
tance customers to bear an increasing share of
the costs of local telephone infrastructure,
effectively forcing long-distance customers to
subsidize the cost of basic phone service.99
The growing gap between the cost of pro-
viding long-distance service and the prices
AT&T charged to consumers created a large
profit opportunity for any firm that could pro-
vide competitive long-distance service. To ward
off this danger, the FCC strictly regulated entry
into the long-distance market between 1942
and 1969.Whennewwireless communications
technologies were developed that could have
offered new competition, the FCC dragged its
feet on approving their use. It approved the use
ofwirelessmicrowave links for private lines (i.e.,
lines owned and used by a single firm) in the
1959 Above 890 decision, but insisted that
AT&Tmaintain itsmonopoly in offering long-
distance service to the general public.100
In 1963, a startup firm called Microwave
Communications Inc. (MCI) applied for per-
mission to build a microwave link between
Chicago and Saint Louis and lease access to
other companies,whichwouldmake it adirect
competitor to AT&T’s long distance business.
After six years of foot-dragging, and in a polit-
ical climate that was beginning to favor com-
petition over monopoly, the FCC finally
approved MCI’s application. In the 1970s,
MCIapplied forpermission tobuildhundreds
more links, creating what became the first
competitive long-distance firm.101
TheFCC’s foot-draggingmost likelydelayed
the introduction of long-distance competition
by a decade or more. MCI had to wait seven
years to get approval for its initial link between
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ChicagoandSaintLouis, andseveralmoreyears
after that before it could offer service to a sig-
nificant fraction of the country. Like the ICC
and theCAB, the FCCprotected a client indus-
try from the vagaries of markets and competi-
tion.Asa result, they foreclosednew innovation
and improvements in consumer welfare.
Deregulation
The deficiencies of these alphabet-soup
agencies inspired a growing body of literature
in the 1960s and 1970s that questioned the
optimistic theories of regulation that had
prompted their creation.102 A new generation
of economists began to realize that real-world
regulators cannot be assumed to be either self-
less or omniscient. Because regulators possess
limited information, they are prone to many
of the same types of errors that can degrade
the performance of markets. Moreover, while
there are certainly honest and public-spirited
regulators, these economists questioned the
common assumption that regulators will con-
sistently be selfless advocates for the interests
of the public.103 The “revolving door” between
regulators and the firms they regulate is elo-
quent testimony to the potential for corrup-
tion of the regulatory process.
Economists began to articulate theories of
“regulatory capture,” in which regulators in-
creasinglycometoservenot thepublicbutorga-
nized interests with business before them.104
They had little trouble finding examples, with
the ICC, CAB, and FCCplaying starring roles.
These academic critiques of regulation
began to percolate inWashington,D.C. An ear-
ly leader on the issue was Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy (D-MA), who chaired the Senate
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and
Procedureof the JudiciaryCommittee.Hehired
future Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer,
then a Harvard law professor and an advocate
of deregulation, to advise the committee.
The absurdity of theCAB’s oversight of the
airline industry made it an ideal poster child,
and Breyer organized a series of hearings in
1975 to highlight the CAB’s anticompetitive
policies.105 When President Carter took office
in 1977, he appointed respected economist
Alfred Kahn to head the CAB. In a virtually
unprecedented development, Kahn began dis-
mantling his own agency’s regulatory author-
ity, steadily increasing the airlines’ freedom to
choose routes and set prices. Congress fol-
lowedhis lead in 1978, passing legislation that
ratified the liberalization he had already
undertaken and authorizing further move-
ment in the same direction.106 The result was
increased competition and greater airline effi-
ciency. From 1976 to 1982 alone, real fares fell
by 8.5 percent despite fuel cost increases of 73
percent over the same period.107
The trucking industry was deregulated in a
similar fashion. The ICC acted on its own
authority to increase competition in the late
1970s, and many of these reforms were rein-
forced byCongresswith theMotorCarrier Act
of 1980. Deregulation dramatically increased
competition and improved economic efficien-
cy by reducing the number of trucks that
made empty return trips due to regulatory
restrictions, for example.108
Telecommunications is amore complicated
case. Full-scale deregulationof telecommunica-
tions has yet to occur, but the trend toward
deregulation did reach the industry in the late
1970s. The FCC continued to loosen restric-
tions on long-distance service throughout the
1970s,andCongress rebuffedAT&T’sefforts to
secure legislation reestablishing its long-dis-
tance monopoly. Then, under the combined
pressure of the FCC, Congress, and a Justice
Department antitrust complaint,AT&Tagreed
in 1982 to divest its local operating companies,
creating a competitive long-distancemarket for
the first time.109
After nearly a century of regulation that
didmore toprevent competition than to serve
consumer welfare, Washington policymakers
finally began taking steps to repeal some of
the most egregiously anti-competitive regula-
tions in the 1970s.
Although we should be cautious about
overstating the similarity between past regula-
tory schemes and proposals for “network neu-
trality” regulation, the failures ofpast regulato-
ry schemes should cause today’s policymakers
to be wary of enacting new regulations that
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could cause similar problems in the future.
Lessons of Deregulation
The most fundamental lesson of 20th-cen-
tury regulatory policy is to beware of unintend-
ed consequences. It is unlikely that in anyof the
three cases we have just examined, Congress
intended to bring about the wasteful and anti-
consumer results that actually occurred. The
Interstate Commerce Act produced a decade of
uncertainty as the courts struggled to interpret
its provisions. The ICC did little to control the
railroads over the subsequent two decades.
Then, from1920until the late1970s, itpursued
policies that overtly aided railroads, trucking
companies, and other politically connected
interest groups at the expense of the general
public. Those outcomes surely were not what
Congress had inmind in 1887.
Perhaps Congress should have known bet-
ter by the time it created the Civil Aeronautics
Board in 1938. Congress felt that restricting
competition in the airline industry would aid
the establishment of a new, struggling indus-
try.110 Whatever themerits of this initial ratio-
nale, the CAB continued to restrict competi-
tion long after flying had become a mature
industry fully capable of standing on its own
two feet. Moreover, the inability to cut prices
caused airlines to engage in wasteful activities
in order to attract customers. Prohibited from
competing on price, airlines competed instead
by spending lavishly on capacity expansion.
Airlines purchasedmore planes and flew their
routes more frequently. As a result, by 1971,
fewer than half the seats on an average airline
flight were filled. Rather than allowing price
reductions to fill those empty seats, the CAB
worked to reduce the number of flights.
Airlines, now unable to compete on either
price or convenience, responded by initiating
the so-called “lounge wars”:
On wide-bodied aircraft, lounges were
introduced in first class, then in coach.
When American installed piano bars,
TWA countered with electronic draw-
poker machines. Live entertainment
proliferated, withmusicians, magicians,
wine-tasters, and Playboy bunnies.111
Congress hoped that the creation of the
Civil Aeronautics Board would create a more
rational, efficient structure for the airline
industry. But the reality was just the oppo-
site: the perverse incentives of the regulatory
process caused airlines to undertake wasteful
activities they never would have undertaken
in a competitive market.
Bureaucratization
Another lesson of these examples is the
capacity of regulators to bureaucratize an
industry. The original Interstate Commerce
Act included nondiscrimination language
strikingly similar to today’s network neutral-
ity proposals. The problemwas that applying
seemingly simple rules to the real world—
with hundreds of railroads, routes, and cate-
gories of cargo—wasmuchmore complicated
than anyone had expected. It wasn’t always
clear how to apply the broad language of the
ICA to specific cases, and the rapid pace of
change in the railroad industry made it a
challenge for the ICC to keep up.
The commission responded to these chal-
lenges in three ways. First, it pressed Congress
for more power and resources. Congress
repeatedly expanded the ICC’s power during
the early 20th century and gave it stronger
powers to punish railroads that failed to com-
ply with its orders. The ICC’s staff swelled
from 104 people in 1890 to 527 in 1909. By
1909, the commission was fielding 1,097 for-
mal complaints and roughly 4,500 informal
ones per year.112
Second, ICCregulation increasingly shifted
from a complaint-based regulatory process to
one based on prior approval of rate changes.
During the ICC’s early years, the railroadswere
free to set their own rates and the ICC and the
courts would rule on the appropriateness of
those rates after the fact. Increasingly, howev-
er, the ICC acquired the power to review rates
before they would go into effect, preempting
those rate changes it felt were inappropriate.
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This forced the railroads to slow down to the
ICC’s stately pace of decisionmaking, which
was the only way the commission could hope
to keep upwith the vast and dynamic railroad
marketplace.
Finally, the ICC felt constrainedbypolitical
realities not to disturb long-established pric-
ing policies, even those that seemed to run
counter to the commission’s broader policy
goals. Historians Ari and Olive Hoogenboom
write that in order to reform the deeper prob-
lems with the railroads’ rate structures, it
would have needed to “disturbmanypowerful
elements of the economy.” And this it was
unwilling to do.113
It’s easy to imagineasimilar fatebefallingthe
FCC shouldCongress give it authority to police
Internet routing policies. The Internet is made
up of thousands of privately owned networks
that interact with one another in a variety of
complex ways. Filing a discrimination com-
plaint with the FCC could become a common
tactic in business disputes between network
providers. There are enough ambiguities in the
basic concept of nondiscrimination (some of
which are discussed below) that it would not be
difficult for a determined firm to find a plausi-
ble example of discrimination in its adversary’s
policies. And given the complexity of modern
network infrastructure, theFCCwouldoftenbe
required to conduct extensive investigations to
determinewhich complaints hadmerit.
It is likely that an overwhelmedFCCwould
respond to its overflowing docket much the
same way the ICC responded to the flood of
discrimination complaints a century ago: by
pushing a lot of the work onto the firms they
regulate.The commissionwouldpressure ISPs
to standardize their business practices and
network configurations to make it easier to
judge whether Commission rules were being
followed. Carriers might be required to make
detailed filings describing their network archi-
tecture and routingpolicies, and to file notices
with the FCC if these changed.
Mission Creep
Once the apparatus of regulatory control
has been put in place, there will be an almost
irresistible temptation to use it for purposes
beyond those in the original legislation or to
expand its scope to new sectors of the econo-
my. The FCC, CAB, and ICC all used their
power over pricing to compel the firms they
regulated to subsidize favored customers at
the expense of nonfavored customers. The
FCC would become embroiled in messy
debates about the filtering of spam, viruses,
pornography, copyrighted material, gambling
applications, and other issues. The FCC’s deci-
sionmaking would likely be influenced by
considerations not specifically mentioned in
statute. For example, a conservative majority
of the FCCmight go easy on ISPs that tried to
filter out content that themajority regardedas
immoral, such as pornography.
There is ample precedent for this kind of
political manipulation in the FCC’s recent
decisions. FCC chairman Kevin Martin has
long been on a crusade to require “à la carte”
pricing of cable television channels. As a New
York Times columnist describes the situation,
“Mr. Martin has long said that he favors à la
carte because it’s pro-consumer, butmost peo-
ple in the cable industry . . . are convinced that
he favors it [because] it will allow parents to
keep MTV and its ilk out of their homes.”114
The cable industry has attempted to mollify
Chairman Martin by introducing a “family
tier” that leaves out channels that social con-
servatives find objectionable.115
We have seen how the ICC’s authority,
which initially extended only to the railroad
industry, was expanded to the entire surface
transportation industry in the early 1930s.
By the same token, once the FCC had gotten
comfortable in its role as Internet neutrality
cop, it might seek expanded authority to reg-
ulate the “neutrality” of search engines, oper-
ating systems, middleware platforms, e-com-
merce services, and the like.
Thwarted Competition and Innovation
Another clear lesson from the histories of
the ICC and the FCC is that regulations can
often be a powerful tool in the hands of
incumbents to keep out new competitors. As
discussed previously, the railroads lobbied to
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extend the ICC’s jurisdiction to the trucking
industry in order to limit competition from
that sector. Similarly, the FCC slowed the
introduction of microwave communications
technologies in order to protect AT&T’s long-
distance business from competition. In recent
years, the cable industry has used franchising
law as a weapon against Baby Bells seeking to
offer competing video services, arguing that
AT&T and Verizon must submit to onerous
city-by-city franchising requirements before
being allowed to offer video service in their
existing service territories.116
In each case, the incumbent firmhasmade
the plausible argument that fairness requires
regulatory parity. But in practice, parity is
inevitably more burdensome to the new
entrant than to the incumbent. There are typ-
ically economies of scale to regulatory com-
pliance, and experienced players generally
have an advantage in practicing before a regu-
latory agency.
More important, complying with old regu-
lations often constrains a new entrant’s tech-
nological options. New entrants often achieve
competitive advantages by rapidly deploying
new, lower-cost technologies. To the extent
that regulation requires all market partici-
pants to roll out “gold plated” services in an
orderly fashion, it will inevitably redound to
the benefits of incumbents. MCI would have
rolledout its longdistance servicedifferently if
it hadn’t been forced to spend its first decade
begging the FCC for permission to compete.
A current example of this is the regulatory
challenges faced by Vonage, the pioneering
Internet telephony firm. One of the ways that
telephone incumbents have slowed Vonage’s
progress is by lobbying for strict enforcement
of a wide variety of regulatory requirements
that already apply to incumbent telecom
firms. In recent years, theFCC, at theurgingof
the Baby Bells, has demanded that Vonage
offer emergency 911 service,117 redesign their
networks to facilitate government eavesdrop-
ping under CALEA,118 and pay into the
Universal Service Fund that subsidizes rural
telephone access.119 Vonage has also had to
beat back demands that it file paperworkwith
regulators in states like New York, Texas, and
Minnesota.120
There may be good policy arguments for
each of these requirements, but the combined
result has been to force Vonage executives to
spend a great deal of time in federal and state
courts and before federal and state regulators
rather than focusing on their business. In addi-
tion, the expenses of compliance—and of filing
paperwork to demonstrate compliance—have
limited Vonage’s ability to compete on price,
which would otherwise be a key competitive
advantage. Any systemof regulation, nomatter
howwell-intentioned, inevitably createsbarriers
to entry that hurt small challengers more than
large incumbents. And limiting competition
ultimately hurts consumers.
This is a particular reason for concern
because there are a variety of wireless tech-
nologies on the drawing board—including
WiMax and the recently completed 700MHz
wireless auction—that have the potential to
shake up the market for residential broad-
band service. It’s conceivable that some of the
competitors could be small, entrepreneurial
firms like MCI circa 1965. The broadband
incumbents will certainly take every oppor-
tunity to place regulatory obstacles in the
path of these new firms. Network neutrality
rules could be turned into just such a barrier.
The advocates of network neutrality regu-
lations mean well. But history suggests that
good intentions are not sufficient to ensure
that a regulatory regime will serve, rather
than hinder, competition and innovation.
Problems are particularly likely when, as in
this case, the rules under consideration are
complex and ambiguous.
The Ambiguity of
Neutrality Regulation
All the disadvantages of network neutrality
regulation discussed above are increased by
the inherent fuzziness of the concept.121 The
Internet is sufficiently complicated and fast-
changing that reasonable people disagree
about exactly how to apply the concept in par-
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ticular situations. History demonstrates that
when Congress enacts a new regulatory
regime, it typically leads to rulemaking and
associated litigation that can drag on for the
better part of a decade. In amarketplace that is
evolving as rapidly as the online world, such
delays can impose significant costs.
Snowe-Dorgan
The network neutrality legislation that has
come closest to being approved by Congress is
the Internet Freedom Preservation Act of
2006, sponsored by Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-
ME), Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND), and oth-
ers.122 It provided that a broadband provider
could not “block, interfere with, discriminate
against, impair, or degrade the ability of any
person to use a broadband service to access,
use, send, post, receive, or offer any lawful con-
tent, application, or service made available via
the Internet.” It also prohibited restrictions on
device attachment, special treatment for affili-
ated content, and charging different rates for
different types of content, applications, or ser-
vices. Snowe-Dorgan included exceptions for
network security and parental controls.
All of these terms are rife with ambiguities.
Such ambiguity is problematicwhen violations
of network neutrality carry stiff legal penalties.
It’s important that those subject to the law
clearly understand what the law requires of
them. Applying concepts in Snowe-Dorgan to
Comcast’s filteringofBitTorrent illustrates this
well.
BitTorrent Filtering
As discussed above, Comcast’s network
recently dealt with congestion by transmitting
packets that misled BitTorrent and other file-
sharing applications into thinking that the
computer at the other end of the connection
had hung up. Would the FCC have found this
policy to be a violation of Snowe-Dorgan? It
seems likely, but far fromcertain, that itwould.
WhileComcastwasn’t technicallyblockingany
packets, Comcast’s actions clearly had the
effect of “interfering with” and “degrading”
BitTorrent traffic.
On the other hand, BitTorrent is widely
used for copyright infringement. Given that
Snowe-Dorgan only protects “lawful” content,
the FCCmight have permitted Comcast’s pol-
icybasedonashowing that thevastmajorityof
BitTorrent traffic consisted of copyrighted
works.On theotherhand, theFCCmighthave
been swayed by the argument that BitTorrent
users consumed a disproportionate share of
traffic and that Comcast’s actions were neces-
sary to maintain the quality of other users’
Internet experience.
In any event, it seems probable that the
FCC’s decisionmaking process would have
beenovertakenby events. Comcast has already
announced changes to its filtering policies
that would have likely rendered any ongoing
proceedings moot. There is little point in hav-
ing a regulatory process that moves so slowly
that its decisions are irrelevant by the time
they are announced.
Verizon and DNS
Another example of ISP activity that some
have characterized as a network neutrality vio-
lation is Verizon’s policy of redirecting failed
DNS queries to Verizon’s own search engine.
As discussed previously, DNS servers translate
a domain name (such as cato.org) into a corre-
sponding IP address. When a user attempts to
access a domain name that does not exist (per-
haps because of mistyping) a DNS server is
expected to return an errormessage and allow
the application to decide how to handle the
error. Instead, Verizon’s DNS servers return
the IP address of its own search engine, allow-
ing Verizon to generate some ad revenue.
As we’ve already noted, DNS servers are
just another network endpoint, architec-
turally speaking. Users who are dissatisfied
with the behavior of Verizon’sDNS server are
free to use a different one. There are a num-
ber of reasons to criticize Verizon’s DNS pol-
icy, but network neutrality doesn’t seem to be
among them.
Some experts disagree. When Ed Felten dis-
cussed the incident on his Freedom to Tinker
blog, he characterized Verizon’s actions as “a
more clear-cut neutrality violation” than Com-
cast’s interference with BitTorrent, because
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Verizon is “interfering with the behavior of the
DNS protocol.”123 Comments on the post by
Felten’s tech-savvy readers were evenly divided
on whether Verizon’s actions implicated net-
work neutrality.
How would the FCC have applied Snowe-
Dorgan in this example? The language of the
bill doesn’t do much to answer the question.
The only thing we can predict for sure is that
a lot of lawyers would have been involved.
FreeWiFi
It is also unclear who would be subject to
network neutrality rules. Snowe-Dorgan de-
fined a “broadband service provider” as any
person who “controls, operates, or resells and
controls any facilityused toprovidebroadband
service to the public, whether for a fee or for
free.” This seems to suggest that coffee shops,
hotels, and other businesses that offered WiFi
access as an incidental part of their business
wouldbe subject tonetworkneutrality require-
ments. If such a provider happened to run a
poorly configured firewall, for example, such a
business could be hauled before the FCC to
justify its network configurations.
There is no good policy rationale for sub-
jecting every small consumer business in
America to network neutrality rules. And of
course, the FCC is unlikely to go out of its way
to harass small businesses. But the literal
meaning of Snowe-Dorgan would have it do
so. Had it passed, the FCC would inevitably
have received a complaint about a small busi-
ness’sWiFi service, and the commissionwould
have had to issue rules about who is subject to
network neutrality regulations.
IPTV
Snowe-Dorgan explicitly exempts any ser-
vice regulatedunderTitle VI of theCommuni-
cations Act from network neutrality regula-
tions. This is the section governing cable
television. That suggests a potential loophole
for network owners wishing to skirt network
neutrality rules: offer video as part of the ser-
vice and characterize it as a “cable service”
rather than a broadband service. Cable and
telephone companies might use this cable
loophole to do many of the things that con-
cern network neutrality proponents. Digital
cable services already have video-on-demand
services, digital channel guides, andpicture-in-
picture support. They could syndicate content
from an Internet-based video service like
YouTube, or roll out enhanced digital services
such as video games, to evade the spirit of leg-
islation like Snowe-Dorgan.
That would put the FCC in the awkward
positionofdecidinghowmuch functionality a
cable system can have before it becomes a full
blown broadband service. Snowe-Dorgan
relies on the definition of cable television
found in the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
Given the rapid pace of technological progress
since then, there are good reasons to doubt if
this definition would be up to the task, and if
not, another years-long inquiry by the FCC
would have to be undertaken.
Jitter
As previously discussed, random delays in
packet delivery (called “jitter”) degrade the per-
formance of latency-sensitive applications. Of
course, someof themajor broadbandproviders
are also telephone companies, and these firms
may be tempted to increase the jitter of their
networks in order to discourage competition
fromVoIP services. Such a strategy would side-
step some of the difficulties that would come
with a strategy of explicit packet filtering
because it could be applied indiscriminately to
all traffic without significantly degrading the
quality of non–latency-sensitive applications
suchaswebsites ande-mail.On theotherhand,
it would degrade the quality of latency-sensitive
applications like network gaming and remote
terminal sessions, so the strategy would not be
without collateral damage.
In either event, Ed Felten has pointed out,
this could be an especially difficult case for
regulators to deal with.124 Some networks
have jitter for reasons beyond the control of
the network owner. In other cases, jitter may
have innocent explanations, but network
owners may choose not to perform network
upgrades that would reduce it. In still other
cases, a network owner might deliberately
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introduce jitter but pretend it had made the
change that caused it for unrelated reasons.
It could be quite difficult for a regulator
to distinguish among these cases. Of course,
a network owner under a network neutrality
regime will never admit that it is increasing
jitter on its network. So the FCC could be
forced to second-guess the complex network-
management decisions of network owners.
The Consequences of Ambiguity
It took 10 years for the Supreme Court
finally to resolvequestions about the Interstate
CommerceCommission’s authority in1897.125
MCI had to wait close to a decade for permis-
sion to build a competitive long-distance net-
work. Things haven’t gotten any better in
recent years. As Christopher Yoo has pointed
out,126 the 1996 Telecommunications Act
prompteda flurryof legalwranglingbefore the
FCC and the federal courts, which culminated
in the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision Verizon
Communications Inc. v. FCC127 and its 2005 deci-
sion in National Cable and Telecommunication
Association v. Brand X Internet Services.128
During this nine-year period, neither
incumbent firms nor potential challengers
knewwhat rules would govern any new infra-
structure investments they might make. This
made incumbents less likely to upgrade their
facilities. But it was much worse for compet-
itive firmswhose business plans depended on
the outcome of these cases. Because many
such firms were bleeding red ink, the incum-
bents needed only to drag out the proceed-
ings long enough for the new entrants to run
out of money.
The same could easily happen if Congress
enacted network neutrality regulations. The
FCCwould likely receive a floodof complaints
about the behavior of variousnetworkowners.
Itwould takemonths, if not years, for the FCC
to ruleon these complaints, andmanyof them
would then be appealed to the courts. At best,
this would be a distraction for firms that
ought tobe focusingondeveloping innovative
new products. At worst, the lack of clarity
could cause some firms to delay entry into the
market until the uncertainty had been
resolved.
Economicefficiency requiresclear legal rules.
When rules are overly complex or ambiguous,
entrepreneurs are forced to spend time on
unproductive activities like lobbying and litiga-
tion, instead of on serving their customers. The
Snowe-Dorgan bill was full of unnecessary
ambiguity and complexity that would have
forced high-tech companies to hire lobbyists
and lawyers instead of engineers. Given the
lessons of history, we are fortunate that Con-
gress did not enact such regulations into law.
Conclusion
For all the passionate disagreement that
has characterized the network neutrality
debate in recent years, there may be fewer dif-
ferences than either side is willing to admit.
Both sides hail the rapid growth of the
Internet and the fiercely competitive online
marketplace it has produced. Both seek to pre-
vent a return to the monopolistic communi-
cations market of past decades, in which large
companies and government regulators collud-
ed tomaintain the status quo to thedetriment
of consumers.
Yet many deregulationists underestimate
the importance of the Internet’s end-to-end
architecture and are too cavalier about aban-
doning the neutral network for a tiered, fil-
tered,more centrallymanagedone.Thedecen-
tralization made possible by the Internet’s
open architecture is the key to its astonishing
growth, and there is little reason to think that
it would be improvement for the Internet’s
decentralized “dumb” architecture to be
replaced by amore centralized “smart” one.
For their part, the “openists” are unduly pes-
simistic about the durability of the open net-
working architecture they have championed for
the last quarter century. In the 1980s, the
Internet triumphed over proprietary networks
precisely because the partisans for open net-
workswere right about the fundamental advan-
tages of open technologies. Now that the
Internet is the world’s dominant communica-
tions network, those same fundamental advan-
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tageswillmakeend-to-endextremelydifficult to
dislodge. Any effort to introduce centralized
control over the Internet will be stymied by the
simple fact thatcentralizedcontrol is inefficient.
That, along with the vigilance of rank-and-file
partisans foropennetworks,will be sufficient to
maintain the Internet’s open architecture.
Only one institution in American society
has the size and power to bring about a return
to the bad old days ofmonopolistic communi-
cations markets: the federal government.
Government regulation of private industry fre-
quently leads to unintended consequences,
and industry incumbents often find ways to
turn the regulatory system to their own bene-
fit. It would be unfortunate if a hasty effort to
enactnetworkneutrality rules led todecadesof
litigationand regulatorybattlesover themean-
ings of network neutrality concepts when the
focus should be on developing new and better
technology. And itwouldbe especially ironic if,
in their effort to protect the Internet against
centralized control by major telecom compa-
nies, the openists laid the groundwork for a
regulatory regime that telecom incumbents
ultimately used to limit competition in the
broadband industry.
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